The Phenomenon of Long-Term Military Deployment (al-Tajmīr) in the Rashidun and Umayyad Periods: Political and Social Implications in Iraq
The study historically examines the phenomenon of “al-tajmīr” (long-term military deployment) in the expeditions during the Rashidun and Umayyad periods, highlighting its political and social effects on the societies of the garrison cities, especially Iraq, which suffered greatly from this phenomenon during the Umayyad era.
The Umayyads adopted this military practice as a means of expanding their conquests into the neighboring eastern realms on the one hand, and as a tool to control political opposition in Iraq on the other.
The subject is divided into three main sections, focusing on the following key points:
1. The concept of “al-tajmīr” in military expeditions, linguistically and terminologically.
2. The emergence of the phenomenon during the time of the Rashidun caliphs, its social and political effects, and the methods the caliphs used to mitigate its negative impact on Arab-Islamic society.
3. The political and social shift of the phenomenon during the Umayyad state, the worsening of its consequences, and the major role played by Umayyad governors in deepening these effects in people’s lives—especially in Iraq.
The Concept of Tajmīr in Military Expeditions: Linguistically and Terminologically
Linguistically: Ibn Manẓūr (d. 711 AH) states in Lisān al-ʿArab:
“Al-jamīr refers to a gathered group of people. Jammara al-jund means: he kept the soldiers stationed at the enemy frontier without sending them back, and this practice has been prohibited. Tajmīr al-jund is to detain them in enemy territory and not allow them to return from the frontier. They are said to yatajammarū—meaning they remain confined; from this also comes the term tajmīr in reference to hair. Al-Aṣmaʿī and others said: Jammara al-amīr al-jaysh—the commander ‘jammara’ the army when he prolonged their stay at the frontier and did not permit them to return to their families.”
Terminologically: Al-Muʿaffā ibn Zakariyā (d. 390 AH) says in his book al-Jalīs al-Ṣāliḥ al-Kāfī wa-al-Anīs al-Nāṣiḥ:
“The judge said: his statement ‘and I will not jammir you at your frontiers’—tajmīr is when a man is sent to the frontier and then left there without being allowed to return to his family or homeland, causing harm to him and exposing him and his household to trials. Justice dictates that soldiers should not be subjected to tajmīr in military expeditions, and that they should be rotated every six months, according to what is deemed suitable. Some earlier rulers rotated them once a year. In our view, it is for the imams and authorities to act according to what best serves the public good—treating people with gentleness, carefully considering their circumstances, and adopting the most effective policies for governing the populace, securing the frontiers, preserving the integrity of the state, protecting its territory, and preventing corruption, sedition, and division of word.”
Tajmīr in military expeditions was thus a military strategy. As for it's history, Al-Ṭabarī reports that Pharaoh was the first to use tajmīr with his troops. Other sources also mention that one of the Sasanian kings was known for keeping soldiers stationed in this way, to the extent that a poet likened the caliph Muʿāwiya ibn Abī Sufyān to that Khosrow, saying:
(معاوي إمّا أن تجهّز أهلنا ... إلينا، وإما أن نؤوب معاويا)
(أجمّرتنا تجمير كسرى جنوده ... ومنّيتنا حتى مللنا الأمانيا)
Muʿāwiyya — either prepare/dispatch our people ... to us, or we will return to Muʿāwiya.
You have tajmīr-ed (stationed) us as Khosrow tajmīr-ed his troops… and you have willed/afflicted us until we grew weary of hopes.
In general, the term tajmīr refers to sending soldiers to the frontier with the enemy for long periods, far from their homelands and families. This undoubtedly left profound social and political effects. How, then, did those in authority and the statesmen address this during the eras of the Rashidun and the Umayyads?
The Emergence of the Phenomenon of Tajmīr in Military Expeditions during the Rashidun Era and Its Social and Political Effects
The issue of tajmīr in military expeditions is mentioned in historical sources as early as the time of the Prophet (ﷺ).
It is reported by Ibn Shabbah (d. 262 AH) in “Tarikh al-Madina al-Munawwarah” that when the delegation of Thaqīf came to the Prophet (ﷺ), he accommodated them in the mosque to soften their hearts, and they stipulated that:
“they should not be mustered for military campaigns, nor should expeditions be imposed upon them, nor should they pay the tithe or tribute, nor should a governor from outside their own people be appointed over them.”
The matter of tajmīr was mentioned again in the first political address of ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb after assuming the caliphate (13–23 AH / 634–643 CE), when he said:
“As for the Muhājirūn, they are under the shade of their swords; grant them their stipends in full and increase their shares, and I will not subject them to long-term deployment in military expeditions. I will act as a guardian over their families until they return.”
Another report is mentioned about ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb by Abū ʿUbayd al-Qāsim ibn Sallām (d. 224 AH) in his book al-Amwāl, narrated from Nāfiʿ, from Ibn ʿUmar:
“ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb did not grant the people of Mecca stipends from the state treasury, nor did he impose military conscription upon them... Abū ʿUbayd commented: Do you not see that he did not assign them regular stipends, since he did not send them out to fight?”
The sources do not provide a detailed explanation of why ʿUmar, at the outset of his rule, publicly exempted the Muhājirūn from tajmīr, nor why this exemption was exclusive to them and not extended to the Anṣār.
Was ʿUmar perhaps attempting to reassure the Muhājirūn—those directly involved in the Saqīfa meeting that resulted in his nomination to the caliphate?
His reference to tajmīr in his inaugural address indicates the significance of the social effects this practice had already left on people’s lives in the early years of his rule. ʿUmar was known for his strict temperament, and it is possible that this sternness generated fears among some of the Muhājirūn that they might be forced to remain at the frontiers. This suggests that participation in military expeditions was compulsory for all, and that soldiers could be held there for extended periods for military reasons.
The Arab state under the caliph ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb began to devote attention to expanding its territories and spheres of influence, entering into warfare with the two greatest empires of the time—the Persian and Byzantine empires. Waging war on both fronts simultaneously posed serious administrative challenges for a newly established state.
ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb ordered his commanders and governors to compel the people to mobilize (al-istinfār) and join the armies fighting on the Syrian and Iraqi fronts, saying:
“Do not leave in Rabīʿah or Muḍar or among their allies any man of strength, nor any horseman, except that you bring him forth. If he comes willingly, then so be it; otherwise, you shall conscript him.”
The origin of organized military recruitment among the Arabs can be traced back to the efforts of ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb. His reign witnessed major conquests in Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Barqah, and Tripoli in North Africa.
As a result, the Arab-Islamic state acquired frontier zones—both land and sea—bordering the Byzantine Empire, as well as land frontiers to the west in al-Jazīrah and Syria.
In the east, it faced vast frontiers bordering many nations such as India, Sind, and the Turks. Thus, it became the duty of Arab Muslims to join military expeditions from Medina and other garrison cities to defend these frontiers.
Tajmīr—the long-term stationing of soldiers—emerged as a consequence of this military strategy. However, this strategy also produced negative social effects, especially the disruption of family life, as households were left vulnerable to instability and fragmentation due to the prolonged absence of their providers who were stationed on the frontiers.
ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb became fully aware of the depth and seriousness of this problem when, during one of his nightly rounds inspecting the homes of Medina, he heard a woman reciting verses of poetry lamenting the long absence of her husband who had been sent on an expedition. The next day, he asked his daughter Ḥafṣah how long a woman could endure separation from her husband. She replied: “Six months.” ʿUmar then issued an order stipulating that no soldier should remain stationed at the frontiers for more than six months.
The caliph was keen to ensure that his governors treated the people with gentleness, and among the forms of gentleness was refraining from subjecting them to tajmīr in the expeditions. This is reflected in his instruction to ʿAmr ibn al-ʿĀṣ, governor of Egypt:
“Do not strike the Muslims, for you will humiliate them; do not withhold their rights, for you will make them disbelieve; do not subject them to long-term deployment in the expeditions, for you will place them in hardship; and do not station them in desolate places, for you will cause them to perish.”
In another statement attributed to ʿUmar, he said:
“Do not subject the army to tajmīr, lest you lead them into temptation (fitnah).”
The fitnah referred to here is the tribulation caused by men being separated from their wives for long periods while stationed at the frontiers. It was the fitnah of women—the strain placed on marital life—that ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb sought to address by limiting the duration of tajmīr in military expeditions to a maximum of six months.
There are several accounts regarding the duration of tajmīr:
One report states that the period was four months, while another mentions six. It is related that ʿUmar asked a group of women:
“How long can a woman endure separation from her husband?” They replied: “Two months she can bear it; in the third month patience begins to weaken; and in the fourth it is exhausted.” So ʿUmar wrote to the commanders of the armies instructing them: “Do not keep any man away from his wife for more than four months.”
Another report states that he set a specific schedule for the soldiers’ absence, in which ʿUmar said:
“People shall travel to their military expeditions for one month, return in one month, and then reside at home for four months.”
Thus he established this as a regulated pattern.
“ʿUmar asked his daughter Ḥafṣah: At what point does a woman most keenly feel the loss of her husband?” She replied: “For two months she does not mind it; at four months she is between two states; at six months it becomes difficult.”
Based on this, ʿUmar fixed six months as the standard duration for military expeditions.
Alongside this issue, there was another matter closely tied to the prolonged absence of husbands—namely, financial maintenance. Who was responsible for providing for the family when its provider was away for long periods?
In the story of the woman whose situation prompted ʿUmar to set a limit on tajmīr, we find that he sent her financial support from the public treasury to assist her with her needs. Yet it is not known whether the state continued to provide for all families whose providers were away, or whether this was a single case in which the caliph’s responsibility ended once the husband returned from battle.
This raises an important question: what about the psychological, social, and material harm suffered by the wife and children during such long absences?
The burden of raising the children and preserving family stability and cohesion fell entirely on the woman during the father’s absence. In some cases, the husband would even divorce his wife, leading to the disintegration of the family due to distance and weakened family ties, while the husband might establish a new household for himself elsewhere. It is narrated from Ibn ʿUmar that:
“ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb wrote concerning the men of Medina who were absent from their wives: let them return to them, or divorce them, or send them financial maintenance. Whoever divorced his wife must still send whatever maintenance he had left owing.”
The intended meaning of maintenance here is the obligation placed on soldiers stationed long-term at the frontiers (majammirīn) to continue providing financially for their families during their prolonged absence, especially when they were unwilling or unable to return quickly to their homes.
In the early years of the caliphate of ʿUthmān ibn ʿAffān (23–35 AH / 643–655 CE), he issued orders to his governor in Syria, Muʿāwiyah ibn Abī Sufyān, to strengthen the forces stationed along the Syrian coastline and to grant them land allotments. He also adopted a new strategy for protecting the borders and frontier zones by relocating tribes from their original homelands to the frontiers. These tribes came to be known as al-nawāqil (“the relocated”). The tribe of Asad and the tribe of Qays were moved from the Ḥijāz, along with groups from Muḍar and Rabīʿah, to the frontiers of al-Jazīrah. Groups from al-Jazīrah, Ḥimṣ, Baʿlabakk, and from the cities of Kūfah and Baṣrah were relocated to the regions around Antioch, upon whom the responsibility of protecting the Syrian frontiers fell.
We thus see that ʿUthmān sought to resolve the issue of defending the Syrian frontiers not by subjecting soldiers to tajmīr but by settling the troops along with their families in these frontier zones.
However, the issue of tajmīr resurfaced in historical sources during the caliphate of ʿUthmān ibn ʿAffān, particularly in connection with the growing tensions between him and the people of the provincial garrison cities (al-amṣār). In the year 32 AH / 652 CE, he summoned all his Umayyad governors—Muʿāwiyah ibn Abī Sufyān, (governor of Syria); Saʿīd ibn al-ʿĀṣ, (governor of Kūfa); ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿĀmir, (governor of Baṣra); and ʿAbd Allāh ibn Saʿd, (governor of Egypt)—to consult them regarding the opposition that had begun to gain strength against him.
According to a report cited by al-Ṭabarī, ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿĀmir, governor of Baṣrah, advised him to jammir (deploy for long periods) the leaders of the opposition at the frontiers, so that they would become occupied with fighting the enemy and distracted from political agitation and inciting the people against him. He said:
“I am of the view that you should send them on these expeditions, stationing them long at the frontiers, until each man is preoccupied with the sore on the back of his mount, and thereby distract them from spreading rumors about you.”
“I advise you instead to look into what has angered them and to appease them. Then distribute to them this money so that it may be divided among them.”
Yet ʿUthmān restored his governors to their posts and ordered them to tighten control over the people under their authority, and he commanded them to subject the populace to tajmīr in the expeditions. He also considered withholding their stipends so that they would comply with him and be compelled to depend on him.
Al-Masʿūdī reports a different version, stating that the one who proposed this opinion was Saʿīd ibn al-ʿĀṣ, governor of Kūfah:
“He dispatched them in the military expeditions until each man’s sole concern was that he might die on the back of his mount.”
When ʿAmr ibn al-ʿĀṣ heard this advice, he went out to the mosque, where he found Ṭalḥah and al-Zubayr sitting in one of its corners. They called him over:
“Come sit with us.”
When he joined them, they asked, “What news do you bring?”
He replied, “Evil—he has left nothing of wrongdoing but that he has done it and ordered it.”
Al-Ashtar arrived, and they said to him: “Your governor, against whom you rose to speak, has been reinstated and has ordered your dispatch to the military expeditions.”
According to another report, Muʿāwiyah ibn Abī Sufyān advised the caliph ʿUthmān ibn ʿAffān to jammir (station for long periods at the frontiers) the Companions ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib, al-Zubayr ibn al-ʿAwwām, and Ṭalḥah ibn ʿUbayd Allāh—who were the remaining members of the consultative council (shūrā) appointed by ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb to choose the next caliph.
This may have been intended to deprive the dissidents in the provincial garrison cities of their anticipated candidates for the caliphate, other than ʿUthmān himself. However, the caliph rejected this suggestion.
The Iraqi opposition marched toward Medina in a formation resembling military battalions, demanding from the caliph several key concessions: that he recall those exiled to Syria, refrain from subjecting them to tajmīr in the expeditions, and provide them with their share of the public revenues (al-fayʾ). These demands aimed to ease the financial and social burdens placed on the chieftains and tribes.
These reports suggest that tajmīr was, for the first time, used as a pressure tactic to deter the rising political opposition against Caliph ʿUthmān ibn ʿAffān and against the growing dominance of the Umayyad family during his reign. Tajmīr thus became a tool of collective punishment employed against anyone who opposed the Umayyad authority.
At the same time, exemption from tajmīr became a means of attracting supporters and allies. The governor of Syria, Muʿāwiyah ibn Abī Sufyān, attempted to use this tactic during the Great Fitnah. Iraq fell into turmoil following the Battle of Ṣiffīn in 37 AH / 657 CE and the subsequent arbitration.
Political and tribal divisions spread within the Iraqi army, especially in Basra, where some soldiers of Caliph ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib (35–40 AH / 655–660 CE) defected from him to form what became known as the “Khawārij,” whom he later fought at the Battle of Nahrawān that same year.
The instability in Basra encouraged Muʿāwiyah to send Ibn al-Ḥaḍramī al-Tamīmī to rally the city’s tribal elites. He read to them a letter from Muʿāwiyah promising them two stipends per year, that they would not be subjected to tajmīr in the expeditions, and that their surplus tax revenues would not be taken from them.
Supporters of ʿAlī rejected the offer, while some of the tribal nobles aligned with the “ʿUthmāniyyah”—those loyal to the late Caliph ʿUthmān—accepted it. A civil war nearly erupted between the tribes of Basra, were it not for the swift intervention of ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib, who moved quickly to suppress Ibn al-Ḥaḍramī’s uprising.
The Phenomenon of Tajmīr in the Umayyad Period and the Intensification of Its Political and Social Effects
The Umayyad caliphs possessed a strong and centralized form of rule, for they safeguarded their frontiers and maintained a powerful army through which they dispatched military expeditions and enforced control over the provincial garrison cities.
This strategic reliance on tajmīr—long-term military deployment—became a political pressure tool and a defining feature of Umayyad governance. This was especially evident in Iraq, which formed the constant center of opposition to Umayyad authority. Indeed, tajmīr became one of the factors that contributed to undermining their rule and deepening hostility toward them within Arab-Islamic society.
How, then, did the Umayyad caliphs use tajmīr both to impose their political dominance over their opponents and to expand the borders of their state?
In reality, the people of Syria were not subjected to long-term tajmīr at the frontiers in the same way the people of Iraq were. Their principal military front was the frontier with the Byzantine Empire, to which they dispatched regular campaigns twice a year, known as al-ṣawāʾif (summer expeditions) and al-shatāwī (winter expeditions).
These campaigns began in the time of Caliph ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb and continued under the Umayyads, becoming fully systematized during the reign of Muʿāwiyah ibn Abī Sufyān thanks to the efforts of ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Khālid ibn al-Walīd, the governor of Ḥimṣ. He sometimes remained in Byzantine territory for two years without returning with his troops as a minimum period.
“I heard Saʿīd ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz—or someone else—relate that Muʿāwiyah kept ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Khālid in winter campaigns for two consecutive years, leading a permanently stationed army in Byzantine lands. Commanders would rotate to him year by year; he would spend both summer and winter with him and did not leave him unattended until ʿAbd al-Raḥmān died in Byzantine territory.”
Moreover, the campaigns launched toward North Africa were undertaken jointly by troops from Syria, the Ḥijāz, and Egypt. Thus, the burden of conquest and frontier defense did not fall solely upon the Syrians, unlike the case of the Iraqis, who alone bore the weight of the wars in the East.
Iraq was the primary arena for implementing the policy of tajmīr, as it was the stronghold of political opposition to the Umayyads and witnessed considerable political turbulence during the reign of Caliph Muʿāwiyah ibn Abī Sufyān (41–60 AH / 661–680 CE). Although, upon assuming the caliphate, he gave political assurances in his inaugural address at the outskirts of Kūfah, declaring:
“…that the nearby expeditions will last for six months, and the distant ones for a year.”
He did not fulfill the promises he had made to the people of Kūfah. The city suffered from tajmīr more than Basra, for it was the main center of the supporters of Imam ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib, who opposed Umayyad rule.
During the governorship of al-Mughīrah ibn Shuʿbah (42–45 AH / 667–670 CE), he preferred maintaining calm rather than suppressing the Kufan opposition to Muʿāwiyah’s rule. However, his successor, Ziyād ibn Abīhi—closely aligned with the Umayyad family—proved far more determined to impose Umayyad authority and secure loyalty, whether through offering financial incentives or through implicit threats, foremost among them tajmīr in military expeditions.
Ibn Qutaybah mentions that Ziyād ibn Abīhi, the governor of Iraq, presented his political program at the gubernatorial assembly in Kūfah, promising that they would receive their stipends and provisions on time and that he would not subject them to tajmīr—provided they offered obedience and compliance.
Ziyād ibn Abīhi (gov. 45–53 AH / 665–672 CE) assumed authority over Basra and its dependent provinces—Khurasan, Sijistān, India, Bahrain, and Oman. He undertook the task of reorganizing the administration of Basra, addressing its notables with reproach and holding them responsible for the moral and social disorder in the city, including theft and the spread of brothels. He assured them that he would neither withhold their stipends and allowances nor subject them to tajmīr in the military expeditions, on the condition that they cooperate with him to achieve political and social security and stability in Basra.
Some Iraqi poets condemned the policy of tajmīr adopted by Caliph Muʿāwiyah, as well as his practice of transferring groups and tribes from one region to another under the pretext of strategic necessity—whether for protecting the frontiers or eliminating political opponents to Umayyad rule.
Upon assuming power, Muʿāwiyah ibn Abī Sufyān sought to weaken these tribes and scatter their influence by instigating discord among them through his agents or by distributing large sums of money among rival groups. He also devised a new method of dealing with political opponents by relocating them from their home regions to other areas. Thus, he transferred groups of Kufans to Syria and the Euphrates region and replaced them with supporters from those same areas—a process known as al-nawāqil (“the relocations”). This, however, proved ineffective due to the intensity of the opposition at the time.
When Ziyād ibn Abīhi later took full control of Iraq, he undertook an even larger relocation: he transferred twenty-five thousand people from Kūfah—together with their families—to Khurasan and settled them there.
The approach of the Zubayrids did not differ from that of the Sufyānids or even the Marwānids in managing the state—especially regarding the use of tajmīr against political opponents. We find that Muṣʿab ibn al-Zubayr, governor of Iraq (67–68 AH / 686–687 CE), threatened the notables of Basra after a failed attempt to overthrow him, which occurred during ʿAbd al-Malik ibn Marwān’s campaign to reclaim Iraq from the Zubayrids in 70 AH / 689 CE.
Muṣʿab punished them severely: he had them beaten, one hundred lashes each; he shaved their heads and beards; demolished their homes; left them exposed under the sun for three days; forced them to divorce their wives; subjected their sons to tajmīr in the military expeditions; paraded them throughout the regions of Basra; and made them swear an oath never to marry free women.
The Umayyad governors used the policy of tajmīr as a political deterrent to prevent uprisings by the people of Iraq against the Umayyad state, and they also employed it to expand Umayyad territories and influence in the East.
This was done without regard for the social consequences endured by the people of Iraq as a result of soldiers being kept far from their families, children, and relatives for prolonged periods.
Tajmīr became one of the most prominent issues generating tension between the Umayyad caliphs and the Iraqis. While some governors attempted to mitigate its harshness and reduce its negative effects—such as Ziyād ibn Abīhi—al-Ḥajjāj ibn Yūsuf (75–95 AH / 694–714 CE) imposed a policy of compulsory conscription upon the Iraqis, enforced with threats of death for anyone who failed to join the expeditions. Thus, one of the key demands of Iraqi revolts was exemption from tajmīr in the expeditions and protection from the loss of their stipends and allowances.
The true extent of al-Ḥajjāj ibn Yūsuf al-Thaqafī’s efforts in organizing these military expeditions became more evident when he assumed full authority over Iraq. He dispatched troops to al-Muhallab ibn Abī Ṣufrah to fight the Khārijites, and he pursued territorial expansion in the eastern regions. ʿAbd al-Wāḥid Dhannūn Ṭāhā writes, in his book “Iraq in the Era of al-Ḥajjāj ibn Yūsuf al-Thaqafī“:
“Mandatory expeditions and the conscription of soldiers existed before al-Ḥajjāj, or were at least known, but al-Ḥajjāj enforced these systems with strictness, which is what made him stand out in this field. He did not allow anyone to abstain from an expedition unless engaged in an official duty for the caliph. Moreover, he conscripted adolescent boys who had reached maturity and imposed military service on them when necessary. He also permitted his governors to take whomever they wished from the provincial populations, equip them, and send them for the eastern conquests.
The stipend he assigned to most soldiers was three hundred dirhams per year, but in return he required that each soldier maintain a complete set of military equipment. This allowance appears to have been insufficient, which led soldiers to complain about the difficulty of meeting these requirements with the limited pay. Meanwhile, the stipend of a Syrian soldier stationed in Iraq was one hundred dirhams per month.”
Iraq continued to suffer from tajmīr during the Marwānid period, and the participation of the Iraqis in the revolt of Ibn al-Ashʿath was rooted largely in their hatred of al-Ḥajjāj ibn Yūsuf, who had imposed Syrian troops over them to consolidate Umayyad rule in Iraq and subjected them to tajmīr in the military expeditions.
In his address to his soldiers, Ibn al-Ashʿath stated that al-Ḥajjāj was ordering them to penetrate deeply into enemy territory—Sijistān—where many campaigns had already failed to defeat the ruler of the Turks, and where large numbers of Iraqi soldiers had been killed.
Al-Ḥajjāj, he argued, cared more about conquering Sijistān than about the safety of the Iraqis. His foremost concern was collecting revenues and spoils from these conquests and strengthening his power and political standing with Caliph ʿAbd al-Malik ibn Marwān. This sentiment appears clearly in the words of Muṭarrif ibn ʿĀmir ibn Wāʾilah al-Kinānī, who was both a poet and an orator:
“al-Ḥajjāj sees in you only what the earlier poet saw when he said to his brother: ‘Put your slave on the horse. If he perishes, he perishes; and if he survives, he survives for your benefit.’ By God, al-Ḥajjāj cares nothing for you—he thrusts you into lands aflame with battle and calamity. If you triumph and gain spoils, he consumes the wealth of the lands and seizes the money, increasing thereby his power. But if your enemy triumphs, you become the despised adversaries for whom he holds no concern and for whose destruction he cares nothing.”
Likewise, one of the notables of Kūfah, ʿAbd al-Muʾmin ibn Shubayṭ ibn Ribʿī al-Tamīmī, declared:
“Servants of God, if you obey al-Ḥajjāj, he will make this land your prison for as long as you live, and he will subject you to the tajmīr of Pharaoh upon his troops—for it has reached me that he was the first to impose tajmīr on soldiers. In my view, you will never again behold your loved ones—unless most of you perish. So pledge allegiance to your commander, turn back to your enemy, and drive him (al-Ḥajjāj) out of your land.”
The people then rushed to ʿAbd al-Raḥmān (Ibn al-Ashʿath) and pledged their allegiance to him. He said:
“Do you pledge allegiance to me to remove al-Ḥajjāj—the enemy of God—and to support me and strive with me until God expels him from the land of Iraq?”
So the people pledged allegiance to him, and at that moment nothing was said about deposing ʿAbd al-Malik.
Al-Muhallab ibn Abī Ṣufrah—the chief of the Azd tribe in Basra—warned al-Ḥajjāj about the harms of tajmīr and the deep longing Iraqi soldiers felt for their families, noting that this was one of the principal causes of Ibn al-Ashʿath’s revolt. In his letter he wrote:
“As for what follows: The people of Iraq are rushing toward you like a torrent descending from a height—nothing will stop it until it reaches its basin. The Iraqis have great fervor when they first march out, but their hearts yearn for their sons and wives. Nothing holds them back until they reach their families and smell their children. Confront them only then, for God will grant you victory over them, God willing.”
When al-Ḥajjāj read this letter he said: “May God do to him such-and-such! By God, he did not write this for my sake, but out of advice for his cousin”—meaning Ibn al-Ashʿath.
Similarly, Thābit Ismāʿīl al-Rāwī, in his “Iraq in the Umayyad Era”, counted tajmīr among the major causes of the Iraqi uprisings against Umayyad authority:
“The Umayyad caliphs exploited the Iraqis in the conquests without granting them a substantial portion of the revenues. The governors would also station Iraqi troops for long periods in distant areas in order to remove their menace. The Iraqis felt this mistreatment keenly and resented that Iraq was left to the Syrians, who wrought corruption in it.”
Before long, the pace of political discontent toward Umayyad administration subsided during the reign of Caliph ʿUmar ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz (99–101 AH / 717–720 CE). As ʿAbd al-Munʿim Mājid notes in his “Political History of the Arab State (The Era of the Umayyad Caliphs)”, Ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz followed a frontier policy quite different from that of his predecessors. He viewed jihād primarily as a means of repelling the threats of Islam’s enemies—not as an effort to seek greater spoils and plunder.
In my view, the conquests had become, for some governors and caliphs, avenues for personal glory; thus Ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz adopted a defensive policy instead. He set the period of frontier service (ribāṭ) for fighters at forty days.
Yet the issue of tajmīr resurfaced near the end of the Umayyad state due to the political struggle within the Umayyad family itself, as rival princes sought to win public support—particularly in the contest between Yazīd ibn al-Walīd and al-Walīd ibn Yazīd. Upon seizing the throne, Yazīd ibn al-Walīd addressed the question of tajmīr in his first speech before the people of Syria in 126 AH / 743 CE. In this address—delivered to justify his killing of Caliph al-Walīd and his rebellion against him, and to persuade the public to pledge allegiance—he declared:
“You have my pledge that I will not place stone upon stone nor brick upon brick;
I will not divert a river, nor increase wealth for myself, nor grant any of it to a wife or child.
I will not transfer revenue from one region to another until I have repaired the poverty and need of the region from which it came, granting its people what sustains them.
If there remains any surplus, I will transfer it to the nearest region whose people are in greater need.
And I will not subject you to long-term deployment at your frontiers, thereby causing hardship to you and your families.
Nor will I shut my door to you so that your weak are deprived of their sustenance.
Nor will I burden the people under your jizyah in ways that drive them from their lands and sever their livelihoods.
Your stipends shall be given to you each year, and your provisions every month,
until livelihoods flow equitably among the Muslims, so that the most distant among them is like the nearest.
If I fulfill what I have promised, then upon you is obedience and loyalty.”
Thus, tajmīr in the military expeditions remained one of the major issues occupying the public mind until the very end of the Umayyad state—a state that had adopted an expansionist military policy necessitating strategies to defend its vast and scattered frontiers. Tajmīr became one of these strategies, but it left behind profound social consequences for the people living under Umayyad rule.
This raises the question: How did the Umayyad state attempt to address the psychological, social, and financial harms suffered by the families of soldiers subjected to long-term deployment (tajmīr) at the frontiers?
The Umayyad state did not take measures to address the psychological or social harm suffered by soldiers subjected to tajmīr in the military expeditions. Soldiers were left stationed at the frontiers for long periods—sometimes for years. The strategic priority of the Umayyad leadership was military expansion, political consolidation, and the suppression of opposition to their rule; the wellbeing of the troops and their families ranked far lower.
Some soldiers attempted to cope with the long separation from their wives through concubinage, taking slave women (imāʾ) as substitutes for their spouses in the frontier regions. Ibn ʿAbd Rabbih relates the story of a man who had been kept on prolonged military service, leaving behind his wife and taking a concubine from among the captives of Azerbaijan. He wrote to his wife verses praising the beauty of the concubine. She replied with verses of her own, threatening that she would replace him with a young man. This story illustrates the social and familial deterioration caused by tajmīr.
Concubinage produced children born to Arab fathers and non-Arab mothers—forming a new social group known as the mawālīd (or muwalladūn). They occupied a lower social rank than “pure” Arabs in early Islamic society.
Among those of this background were Shurayk ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Qāḍī, Sufyān al-Thawrī, Isrāʾīl, al-Fuḍayl ibn ʿIyāḍ, and other jurists of Kūfah. They were born in Khurāsān, where the military expeditions were severe and prolonged. Some soldiers practiced concubinage, others married local women, and when the armies returned, the soldiers brought their children with them back to Kūfah. Al-Fuḍayl said: “I was born in Samarqand—I was from Nasa—and I once saw ten thousand walnuts sold for a single dirham.” He later became a notorious bandit, cutting off roads between Abīward and Marw.
The Arabs labeled these mixed-heritage children “hajīn,” and in pre-Islamic Arabia, such children did not inherit. This attitude seems to have persisted into early Islamic society as well. The Umayyad caliphs, for example, “did not give the oath of allegiance to sons of slave women,” which people understood as contempt for them.
But in reality, the Umayyads feared the old prophecy that their rule would fall at the hands of a son of an umm walad (slave concubine who bore a child).
Indeed, the defects in their system became apparent when a caliph arose who was the very person they feared: His mother was the daughter of Yazdagird, the last Sasanian king. He lasted only seven months before dying, and Mervān ibn Muḥammad—whose mother was Kurdish—succeeded him. Rumors circulated against him as well.
Yet no son of ʿAbd al-Malik ibn Marwān was more strategic, intelligent, courageous, generous, or open-handed than Maslama ibn ʿAbd al-Malik; nevertheless the family excluded him for this same reason.
Another example—although from the Abbasid period—also confirms that this social attitude persisted in the Arab tribes, especially the Bedouins.
During the time of Abū Jaʿfar al-Manṣūr (136–158 AH / 754–775 CE), an Arab from the Banū al-ʿAnbar (of Tamīm) protested before the judge Suwār ibn ʿAbd Allāh in Basra. Suwār had granted a share of inheritance to the man’s half-brother from a non-Arab mother. The Bedouin argued:
“My father died and left me and my brother”—and he drew two lines—“and left a hajīn”—drawing another line aside—“so how should the inheritance be divided?”
Suwār asked: “Is there any other heir besides you?”
The Bedouin replied: “No.”
Suwār said: “Then the estate is divided into thirds.”
The Bedouin protested: “You have not understood me! He left me, my brother, and a hajīn—how can the hajīn take as I take, and as my brother takes?”
Suwār answered: “Indeed, he does.”
The Bedouin grew angry and said: “By God, you are a man with few maternal uncles in al-Dahnāʾ!”
Suwār replied calmly: “That will not harm me in the sight of God.”
Although this incident dates to the early Abbasid period, it provides a valuable indication that tribal Arabs—especially the Bedouins—continued to prefer that “mixed-blood” brothers (hujanāʾ) not inherit along with the “pure” Arabs, following pre-Islamic custom. Arabs traditionally looked down on the sons of concubines, and although this prejudice weakened over time as concubinage increased, it lingered.
Al-Aṣmaʿī reports: “Most of the people of Medina disliked slave women until ʿAlī ibn al-Ḥusayn, al-Qāsim ibn Muḥammad, and Sālim ibn ʿAbd Allāh were born from them—and they surpassed the people of Medina in jurisprudence, knowledge, and piety. Then people began to desire the sarārī (slave concubines).”.
Conclusion
1. The Umayyad state succeeded, through the policy of tajmīr in military expeditions, in achieving its strategic objective of military expansion—extending the borders of its empire until it confronted the Turks and Khazars in the East, and reached al-Andalus and southern France in the West.
2. The Umayyads also used this policy as a means of neutralizing their political opponents, keeping them preoccupied with frontier warfare and preventing them from initiating revolts against Umayyad authority. This was particularly the case in the provinces most prone to rebellion—chief among them Iraq.
3. Despite the political and military gains the Umayyad state derived from the policy of tajmīr, it had serious negative social consequences, including:
A. The people of the provinces developed deep resentment toward Umayyad rule and its authoritarian practices, especially the coercion to fight on distant frontiers and to remain there for long periods under harsh conditions, far from their families and homelands.
B. Tajmīr contributed to family disintegration and the deterioration of the social and material conditions of households whose breadwinners were stationed indefinitely at the frontiers. Families faced divorce, abandonment, and the creation of new domestic lives by soldiers who remained in the frontier zones, either through marriage to local women or concubinage.
C. A new generation emerged—children of Arab fathers and non-Arab mothers—known as the mawālīd. They did not enjoy the same social standing as “pure” Arabs. Some turned to scholarship, jurisprudence, and religious learning in an effort to improve their social position in a society shaped by tribal hierarchy; others appear to have been drawn toward banditry or marginal livelihoods.
Sources:
Primary Sources:
1. Ibn al-Athīr – al-Kāmil fī al-Tārīkh
2. Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya – Iʿlām al-Muwaqqiʿīn ʿan Rabb al-ʿĀlamīn
3. Ibn Ḥajar – Lisān al-Mīzān
4. Ibn Khaldūn – al-Muqaddimah
5. Ibn Saʿd – al-Ṭabaqāt al-Kubrā
6. Ibn Shabba – Tārīkh al-Madīnah al-Munawwarah
7. Ibn ʿAbd Rabbih – al-ʿIqd al-Farīd
8. Ibn Qutaybah al-Dīnawārī – al-Imāmah wa al-Siyāsah
9. Ibn Manẓūr – Lisān al-ʿArab
10. Abū al-Baqāʾ al-Kafawī – Kitāb al-Kulliyāt
11. Abū ʿUbaydah – Kitāb al-Amwāl
12. al-Balādhurī – Ansāb al-Ashrāf
13. al-Balādhurī – Futūḥ al-Buldān
14. al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī – Tārīkh Baghdād
15. al-Dīnawarī – ʿUyūn al-Akhbār
16. al-Subkī – Ṭabaqāt al-Shāfiʿiyyah al-Kubrā
17. al-Ṭabarī – Tārīkh al-Rusul wa al-Mulūk
18. al-Māwardī – al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyyah wa al-Wilāyāt al-Dīniyyah
19. Muḥibb al-Dīn al-Ṭabarī – al-Riyāḍ al-Naḍrah fī Manāqib al-ʿAsharah
20. Muḥammad ibn ʿĀʾidh al-Dimashqī – Kitāb al-Ṣawāʾif
21. al-Masʿūdī – Murūj al-Dhahab
22. al-Muʿaffā ibn Zakariyyā – al-Jalīs al-Ṣāliḥ al-Kāfī wa al-Anīs al-Nāṣiḥ al-Shāfī
23. Yāqūt al-Ḥamawī – Muʿjam al-Buldān
Secondary Sources:
1. ʿAbd al-Wāḥid Dhannūn Ṭāhā – Iraq in the Era of al-Ḥajjāj ibn Yūsuf al-Thaqafī
2. ʿAbd al-Munʿim Mājid – Political History of the Arab State (The Era of the Umayyad Caliphs)
3. Thābit Ismāʿīl al-Rāwī – Iraq in the Umayyad Era
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