The Administration Crisis of Basra during the Umayyad Interregnum: Local Governance in the Aftermath of Yazīd b. Muʿāwiya’s Death

In this article, we sought to demonstrate how the people of Basra, who intervened in the administration of the city due to the administrative crisis that emerged following the death of Yazīd b. Muʿāwiya (d. 64/683) while Basra was under Umayyad rule, governed the city through governors they selected from among themselves. 

Our study was based on data obtained through examinations of the primary sources of Islamic history. By combining the data we obtained with our own interpretations, we concluded that in situations where state authority disappears from governance, the populace may experience chaos; that administering a city through temporary governments gives rise to various problems; and that, in order to overcome these problems, the establishment of a new state authority becomes necessary.

It has been observed that, due to the absence of a higher authority, the lives and property of individuals in society were placed under threat, state supervision ceased to exist, and anarchy reached its peak—facts that were personally witnessed by the people of Basra. 

With regard to our subject, we found that no detailed study had previously been conducted under this heading. The fact that such periods marked by chaos have not been sufficiently addressed in scholarly research renders our study original. 

This study will contribute to the field by revealing how Basra, having fallen outside the administration of the Umayyad State, was governed for a short period by governors chosen from among its own people.

Introduction

Islam encouraged humanity to transition from a nomadic (Bedouin) society to a sedentary (urban) one and held humankind responsible for cultivating and developing the earth. Acting with this sense of responsibility, Muslim conquerors, following the death of the Prophet Muhammad, established new cities outside the Arabian Peninsula, thereby contributing to the formation of Islamic civilization. 

One of these cities was Basra, which was ingeniously founded in AH 14 by Muslims, in line with the vision of the Caliph ʿUmar and the efforts of ʿUtba b. Ghazwān, with the aim of facilitating Islamic conquest movements. Basra was the first military city constructed by Arabs solely with the logic of jihād. Arab Muslims played a decisive role in the city’s naming, characterization, and development. 

From the construction phase onward, Basra was founded through consultation with knowledgeable individuals and completed its development in the same consultative manner. After becoming a military encampment for the Islamic army, Basra experienced rapid population growth and expanded swiftly.

This city also served as a model for the establishment of other cities in terms of geography, economy, and military organization. Following the martyrdom of ʿAlī, Basra came under Umayyad rule and was subjected to their authoritarian governance. Governed by Umayyad governors such as Bishr b. Marwān, Ziyād b. Abī Sufyān, Samura b. Jundab, and ʿUbaydullāh b. Ziyād—figures distinguished by their excesses and their willingness to commit any crime to consolidate Muʿāwiya’s authority—Basra was freed from Umayyad administrators as a result of the administrative crisis that emerged after the death of Yazīd b. Muʿāwiya.

Until the death of Yazīd b. Muʿāwiya, the people of Basra had not been particularly active in political affairs. During the ensuing crisis, however, they attempted to overcome the situation through figures such as ʿUbaydullāh b. Ziyād and ʿAbdullāh b. al-Ḥārith—chosen from among the Basrans themselves—who emerged with the discourse that allegiance should be pledged to them until a “permanent political authority” was established.

 Initially pledging allegiance to ʿUbaydullāh b. Ziyād, the Basrans transformed the situation into a crisis of selecting one of their own when the people of Kūfa rejected ʿUbaydullāh’s call for allegiance. However, this process did not unfold as the Basrans had expected. Events became increasingly complex, and a severe political chaos emerged in Basra.

 Realizing that this form of governance could not be sustained through governors chosen from among themselves without the backing of a strong political authority, the people of Basra were compelled to pledge allegiance to ʿAbdullāh b. al-Zubayr. Thus, Basra passed out of Umayyad control and came under the rule of ʿAbdullāh b. al-Zubayr.

The examination of this period—which led Basra to break away from Umayyad rule and come under a different authority—constitutes the primary motivation for this study. The fact that the events and crises experienced during this transitional phase of governance have largely been overlooked in contemporary scholarship distinguishes this study from previous works.

1. ʿUbaydullāh b. Ziyād and the Administration of Basra

ʿUbaydullāh b. Ziyād was the son of Ziyād b. Abī Sufyān, Muʿāwiya’s famous governor of Iraq. Born in Basra in 28/648, ʿUbaydullāh was one of the prominent governors and commanders of the Umayyad state. His mother’s name was Marjāna. Although he is commonly known as Ibn Ziyād, he was often referred to as Ibn Marjāna in attribution to his mother. His kunya was Abū Ḥafṣ, and his epithet was “al-Jazzār” (the Butcher), owing to his ruthless killing of many people.

Spending his youth in Basra alongside his father, ʿUbaydullāh was among the favored governors of both Muʿāwiya b. Abī Sufyān and Yazīd b. Muʿāwiya. Appointed first as governor of Khurāsān and later of Basra by Muʿāwiya, ʿUbaydullāh attained his long-cherished ambition of governorship. After assuming office, he dealt with the Khārijite problem—one of the greatest challenges facing the Umayyad state—and thereby consolidated state authority.

Following the death of Muʿāwiya b. Abī Sufyān, his son Yazīd b. Muʿāwiya succeeded him. In order to strengthen his contested caliphate in the Iraqi region, Yazīd, like his father, appointed ʿUbaydullāh b. Ziyād as governor of Basra. While ʿUbaydullāh succeeded in reinforcing Yazīd’s authority, his distinctive style of governance earned him the hatred of the people of Basra and led to practices that severely restricted their freedoms. In the Iraqi region—Basra and Kūfa alike—ʿUbaydullāh pursued the Khārijites in line with his father’s policies, accusing and executing people merely on suspicion, without making any distinction.

With the death of Yazīd b. Muʿāwiya, the strict measures imposed against the Khārijites in Basra during the Umayyad period turned into a crisis. Seeking to exploit the resulting power vacuum and political turmoil, ʿUbaydullāh attempted to turn the situation to his own advantage, endeavoring first in Basra and then in Kūfa to obtain the caliphate under the guise of governorship. For with the death of the caliph, ʿUbaydullāh’s obligation of obedience to him had ceased, and the political arena was left open to him. As someone who had been born, raised, and served as governor in Basra, he considered himself entitled to undertake this struggle.

However, the people of Basra were dissatisfied with the Umayyad governors, particularly Ziyād b. Abī Sufyān and his son ʿUbaydullāh b. Ziyād. At the same time, they found themselves powerless in confronting the Khārijites, who constituted their greatest problem. The uncompromising, violence-based policies of Ziyād and ʿUbaydullāh proved effective in suppressing the Khārijites.

1.1. ʿUbaydullāh b. Ziyād’s Receiving Allegiance in Basra

ʿUbaydullāh b. Ziyād received news of Yazīd’s death from Ḥumrān, his freed slave and the envoy he had sent to Yazīd. Ḥumrān secretly conveyed this news to ʿUbaydullāh and informed him of the turmoil occurring in the Syrian region. Thereupon, ʿUbaydullāh gathered the people of Basra in the mosque and, without overlooking the disputes in Syria, announced the news of Yazīd’s death. He also spoke of certain shortcomings of Yazīd, to whom he had until very recently shown unwavering loyalty.

He then stated that he had been born and raised in Basra and had served its people; that he had increased the number of fighters from seventy thousand to one hundred thousand; and that he had punished those who harmed society, thereby recounting his administrative achievements.

 ʿUbaydullāh b. Ziyād emphasized that Yazīd was dead and that the administration in Syria was divided by differing opinions. He asserted that Basra was in a more advantageous position than Syria—being wealthy, self-sufficient, in need of no other region’s people, and indispensable to others; that it was numerically superior and possessed vast plains. He added that, should they wish, the people could choose someone with whom they would be satisfied in both religious and worldly matters, and that he himself would be the first to consent to such a choice. He further stated that if the person chosen by the Syrians pleased them, they could pledge allegiance to him; but if they were displeased, they could continue their struggle until they attained the outcome they desired.

In this speech, after describing the services he had rendered to Basra during his tenure as governor, ʿUbaydullāh emphasized the importance of Basra as a region and, perhaps unintentionally, instilled a sense of self-confidence among the Basrans. He even explicitly suggested that a new political structure could emerge based on the power of the people of Basra. Influenced and encouraged by this address, the Basrans sought to pledge allegiance to ʿUbaydullāh b. Ziyād.

 According to reports, ʿUbaydullāh initially stated that he had no need for their allegiance; however, upon their insistence, he extended his hand and accepted their pledge in the year 64 AH.

We wish to clarify this episode by expressing certain reservations regarding the authenticity of this report. First, in this speech, ʿUbaydullāh b. Ziyād criticized the previous administration to which he had been affiliated, attempting to present himself as though he had not been a governor during that period. 

Subsequently, by describing his activities in Basra as a local governor and explaining how he had driven the Khārijites out of the city, he created the impression that he was a candidate for power. In effect, he conducted a form of electoral propaganda, portraying himself favorably in the eyes of the Basrans and leading them to consider him a suitable candidate. His effective oratory must have had a positive impact on the city’s inhabitants, as the Basrans pledged allegiance to ʿUbaydullāh b. Ziyād.

Moreover, following the allegiance he received from the people of Basra, ʿUbaydullāh distributed generous stipends (ʿaṭāʾ) to them. It is reported that, in order to distribute these payments, he appointed a scribe and ordered that the disbursement of the funds be expedited, to the extent that the appointed scribe even determined the stipends by candlelight at night. Reports further state that the total amount of stipends distributed reached eight million or nine million dirhams.

1.2. ʿUbaydullāh b. Ziyād’s Attempt to Obtain Allegiance in Kūfa and His Expulsion by Stoning

After receiving allegiance from the people of Basra, ʿUbaydullāh b. Ziyād sought to expand the scope of this allegiance by obtaining a pledge from the people of Kūfa as well. He claimed that he had accepted the allegiance of the Basrans only at their insistence and that he had no need for governorship or authority. However, his attempt to secure allegiance from the Kūfans after obtaining it in Basra demonstrates the emptiness of this claim.

According to a report transmitted by al-Ṭabarī, ʿUbaydullāh appointed ʿAmr b. Misʿa and Saʿd b. Karhā of the Banū Tamīm to inform the Kūfans of the allegiance pledged by the people of Basra and to invite them to pledge allegiance to him as well. 

As in Basra, ʿUbaydullāh addressed the people gathered in the Kūfa mosque, announcing the death of Yazīd b. Muʿāwiya and stating that circumstances had changed and that the power of the Umayyad administration had been broken. He declared that if they were to appoint him as leader until the people agreed upon a caliph, he would fight their enemies, rule among them with justice, protect the rights of the oppressed, and prevent the tyranny of the oppressors.

Among those listening was Yazīd b. al-Ḥārith b. Yazīd al-Shaybānī (known as Ibn Ruwaym), who reacted strongly, stating that they praised God for having been freed from the Banū Umayya and from ʿUbaydullāh himself, that there would be no room for personal considerations in this matter, and that they would never pledge allegiance to him in order to preserve their honor and independence.

ʿUbaydullāh was displeased by this reaction and ordered that Yazīd b. al-Ḥārith be arrested and imprisoned. However, the Banū Bakr b. Wāʾil tribe intervened and prevented this action. When ʿUbaydullāh b. Ziyād ascended the pulpit and attempted once again to address the people, he was pelted with stones and cursed.

Following this speech in the Kūfa mosque, the question arises as to why ʿUbaydullāh encountered such a strong reaction and whether he had anticipated it. The answer to the first question is clearly evident in the sermon he delivered in the Kūfa mosque. ʿUbaydullāh b. Ziyād, who had been a devoted and loyal administrator of the Umayyad state—demonstrating extreme commitment to the point of killing and being killed for its sake—had already provided a guarantee of what he would do in the future through his past actions on behalf of the Umayyads. In seeking to exploit the political vacuum that emerged after the death of Yazīd b. Muʿāwiya, ʿUbaydullāh had already revealed his personality and character during his tenure as an Umayyad governor.

In his sermon, he deliberately used the phrase “until the people unite around a caliph,” requesting authority for what appeared to be a limited period. His true objective, however, was first to seize power and then to consolidate it.

 The people of Kūfa, however, had already experienced how fiercely he had pursued the killing of Ḥusayn and how obedient he had been to the regime he served. When he declared:

“I will be just among you, protect the rights of the oppressed, and prevent the oppression of the oppressors,”

 the Kūfans were well aware of how unjust and tyrannical he truly was. Having long been weary of the Umayyads and their administrators, the people of Kūfa had no desire to relive the same experiences.

This leads us to the second question: did ʿUbaydullāh b. Ziyād not anticipate such a reaction from the people of Kūfa? 

As someone deeply familiar with Iraq and having served as governor there for many years, ʿUbaydullāh considered himself likely to succeed in obtaining allegiance. However, he failed to recognize a crucial detail: the Iraqis, and the Kūfans in particular, were a community that frequently demanded the replacement of governors and regularly complained about them. 

Muʿāwiya b. Abī Sufyān, with his political acumen, was aware of this reality and therefore avoided direct confrontation with the populace, replacing governors whenever necessary.

The people of Kūfa had never truly accepted Umayyad rule; they merely submitted to it because the Umayyads held power. The Umayyad state sustained itself in Kūfa by pursuing a deeply rooted policy of hostility toward the supporters of ʿAlī—seeking to marginalize, vilify, and humiliate them.

 Now ʿUbaydullāh b. Ziyād appeared before them demanding allegiance and promising justice. For the Kūfans, believing such promises was impossible. They had been given an opportunity and wished to rid themselves of the Umayyads and their administrators.

1.3. The Basrans’ Withdrawal of Their Allegiance to ʿUbaydullāh b. Ziyād

Since Kūfa and Basra were geographically close to one another and both formed part of the Iraqi provincial administration, they were mutually influential. When news of the Kūfans’ actions against ʿUbaydullāh b. Ziyād reached Basra, the Basrans declared that it was impossible for them to appoint to office a corrupt man whom the people of Kūfa had dismissed from authority. Consequently, the allegiance of the Basrans did not last long. Following the Kūfans’ rejection of allegiance, the Basrans—whose stance proved highly volatile—quickly turned against ʿUbaydullāh and renounced their pledge to him.

One of the Basran leaders, Ibn Abī Zuʾayb, warned that allegiance to ʿUbaydullāh b. Ziyād should be avoided and stated that there was no one more worthy or more virtuous for this matter than ʿAbdullāh b. al-Zubayr, to whom allegiance should instead be pledged. This speech had a strong impact on the people, and the Khārijites, taking advantage of the situation, escaped from ʿUbaydullāh’s prisons and gathered among themselves, while the tribes likewise began to organize independently.

It would be incorrect to assume that the Basrans withdrew their allegiance solely because the Kūfans had refused to pledge allegiance. In fact, the Basrans harbored deep resentment toward Umayyad governors due to their style of governance and were unwilling to accept their caliphate. Nevertheless, they had been compelled to submit out of helplessness in the face of the silencing power exercised by Muʿāwiya’s governors, Ziyād and ʿUbaydullāh. ʿUbaydullāh b. Ziyād was not a popular figure; the Basrans did not want him. He was among the harshest administrators in his treatment of the Arabs. When the opportunity finally presented itself, the Basrans wished to seize it.

As these developments unfolded, the effects of a chaotic atmosphere became evident in Basra: oppositional voices grew louder, and an organized resistance began to emerge. Some Basrans were even so intolerant of ʿUbaydullāh’s oppressive practices that they called for his death. As each tribe sought to bring its own members into power, the administrative crisis turned into one of sedition and disorder. This environment ultimately benefited ʿAbdullāh b. al-Zubayr.

One of Ibn al-Zubayr’s supporters, Salama b. Zuʾayb b. ʿAbdullāh b. al-Yarbūʿī al-Ḥanẓalī of the Banū Tamīm, called upon the people of Basra to pledge allegiance to ʿAbdullāh b. al-Zubayr. When these calls met with positive responses, the people of Basra began to pledge allegiance to Ibn al-Zubayr. Upon learning of this development through ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Bakr, ʿUbaydullāh b. Ziyād gathered the people of Basra and addressed them once again.

 He reminded them of his conduct toward them and recalled that he had invited them to pledge allegiance to whomever they found acceptable. He complained that while some among them had pledged allegiance to ʿAbdullāh b. al-Zubayr, others had withdrawn their allegiance altogether; that rumors had spread against him; that his orders were no longer obeyed; that his opinions were disregarded; and that Salama b. Zuʾayb was calling for division. He accused them of seeking to fracture society, set people against one another, and provoke mutual bloodshed.

Following this speech, the leading figures of Basra, once again stirred up, promised to capture and hand over Salama. However, fearing for his safety, they refrained from doing so and ultimately abandoned the idea of delivering him to ʿUbaydullāh. According to another report, ʿUbaydullāh addressed the Basrans in a demeaning manner, saying:

 “By God, even if you were to gather together to cut off a donkey’s tail, you would not be able to do it. You are capable of nothing.” 

Such humiliating remarks played a significant role in the Basrans’ hostile behavior toward him and in their inclination toward ʿAbdullāh b. al-Zubayr.

Salama’s oppositional efforts eventually proved successful, as he managed to gather many supporters around him. In response, ʿUbaydullāh first attempted to confront the opposing voices represented by the supporters of ʿAbdullāh b. al-Zubayr. He summoned the leading commanders of the troops he had brought from Bukhara and ordered them to fight. However, aware of ʿUbaydullāh’s weakened position and anticipating that any conflict would end in his defeat, both his full brother ʿAbdullāh b. Ziyād and the Basrans refused to comply. Indeed, his brother ʿAbdullāh declared unequivocally, “If you fight the Basrans, I will kill myself with my own sword.”

Having failed in his initial attempt and finding no support among the Basrans, ʿUbaydullāh lost hope. Following the warnings of his brother and his soldiers—and becoming convinced that their assessment was correct—he ultimately chose to abandon the city and sought refuge with Masʿūd b. ʿAmr, the leader of the Azd tribe.

1.4. ʿUbaydullāh b. Ziyād’s Flight from Basra and His Seeking Refuge with Masʿūd b. ʿAmr

Having fallen into the position of an unwanted governor and finding himself in an extremely difficult situation, ʿUbaydullāh b. Ziyād had no choice but to leave Basra. For the people of Basra, this was an opportunity: the hardships and sufferings they had endured were now being avenged. Yet the Basrans were not as cruel as ʿUbaydullāh himself. Although they contemplated killing him, they ultimately refrained from doing so.

While still in his palace, the twelve-thousand-strong combat force that ʿUbaydullāh had previously assembled for himself became a source of humiliation for him; it turned into an oppositional force, confronted him, and abandoned him. Despite the vast sums he had spent on the palace at al-Bayḍāʾ, ʿUbaydullāh b. Ziyād found himself besieged there by the people of Basra.

 In order to escape this situation, he sought refuge among powerful tribes. He initially considered seeking protection from the tribes of Tamīm and Bakr, but he could not be certain of their loyalty.

Thereupon, recalling his father’s advice—“If one day you are compelled to flee, seek refuge with al-Ḥārith b. Qays al-Jahmī”—ʿUbaydullāh requested asylum from al-Ḥārith. Al-Ḥārith informed him that the people did not think favorably of him and that his conduct toward the Azd tribe had also been reprehensible. Expressing reproach, al-Ḥārith stated that although his people had shown kindness to Ziyād, ʿUbaydullāh’s father, and to ʿUbaydullāh himself, these favors had gone unreciprocated and had earned them neither esteem nor standing in return. ʿUbaydullāh was thus unwanted both by the populace and by the Azd tribe; all of his past actions now stood against him.

Nevertheless, al-Ḥārith, adhering to Arab customs regarding the protection of a supplicant, wished to assist ʿUbaydullāh and was willing to take certain risks on his behalf. Before departing, ʿUbaydullāh took with him funds from the public treasury (Bayt al-Māl), variously reported in historical sources as nineteen million or sixteen million dirhams. 

He distributed part of this money among his Umayyad supporters and concealed the remainder. With these funds, he fled and asked al-Ḥārith to take him to the house of Masʿūd b. ʿAmr of the Azd tribe. Another reason for ʿUbaydullāh’s choice was that Masʿūd’s wife, Umm Bistān, was the daughter of ʿUbaydullāh’s paternal uncle.

Disguising ʿUbaydullāh in women’s clothing, al-Ḥārith secretly led him out of Basra and brought him to Masʿūd b. ʿAmr b. Muḥārib, the leader of the Azd. Traveling by night and attempting to flee in concealment, ʿUbaydullāh b. Ziyād encountered life-threatening dangers along the way. 

Although Masʿūd b. ʿAmr anticipated that harboring him would place him in grave danger and was displeased by his arrival, he nevertheless accepted him due to the prior pledge between them.

The Khārijites, like the Basrans, also sought to be rid of ʿUbaydullāh b. Ziyād. His relentless and brutal policies against them had driven them to fury, and for this reason he was pursued by the Khārijites as well. 

Together with Basran tribes opposed to ʿUbaydullāh, the Khārijites attempted to force ʿUbaydullāh and his brother ʿAbdullāh out of the house of Masʿūd b. ʿAmr, where they had taken refuge. However, ʿUbaydullāh’s brother ʿAbdullāh resisted, declaring, “We will not leave the place to which we have sought refuge.” Because they refused to emerge from Masʿūd b. ʿAmr’s house, certain tribes and Khārijites mistakenly killed Masʿūd b. ʿAmr, believing him to be ʿUbaydullāh b. Ziyād.

Presenting the various reports concerning the killing of Masʿūd b. ʿAmr is important in order to clarify ambiguous aspects of the event. Before fleeing to Syria, ʿUbaydullāh b. Ziyād had sought refuge with Masʿūd b. ʿAmr, one of the leaders of the Azd tribe (d. 64/683). When Ibn Ziyād departed from Basra, he left Masʿūd as his deputy there. In response, the tribes of Tamīm and Qays opposed this arrangement, declaring that they would not accept it unless someone agreeable to their own tribes was appointed. Masʿūd b. ʿAmr, leader of the Azd, countered by stating, “Ibn Ziyād appointed me here as his deputy, and I do not intend to relinquish this position,” and he proceeded to assume office and continue receiving allegiance.

Meanwhile, the people of Basra—unwilling to accept the governor appointed as Ibn Ziyād’s deputy—sought to choose a governor from among themselves. They appointed Nuʿmān b. Ṣuḥbān al-Rāsibī and Qays b. al-Haytham as representatives to select an amīr. 

Qays favored ʿAbdullāh b. al-Aswad al-Zuhrī, while Nuʿmān b. Ṣuḥbān preferred ʿAbdullāh b. al-Ḥārith b. Nawfal b. al-Ḥārith b. ʿAbd al-Muṭṭalib b. Hāshim, known as “Babba.” However, they failed to reach a consensus. Nuʿmān—reported to have been a Shiʿite—argued for the appointment of ʿAbdullāh b. al-Ḥārith by emphasizing his Hāshimite lineage and kinship ties with the Umayyads, and through a fait accompli installed Babba in the governor’s palace in Jumādā al-Ākhirah 64/684. 

When this appointment, carried out without broad consultation, was rejected by the leading figures of Basra, yet another atmosphere of chaos emerged in the city.

Following the killing of Masʿūd b. ʿAmr, new disputes arose in Basra among the tribes regarding who was responsible for his death. According to reports, the Banū Tamīm tribe, who sought to have Masʿūd b. ʿAmr removed from authority, asked ʿAbdullāh b. Ḥārith—whom the people of Basra had chosen from among themselves as governor—to intervene in the matter. When they received a negative response from the governor, the leaders of Banū Tamīm then turned to al-Aḥnaf b. Qays and requested that he resolve the situation. Acting on the order of the tribal leader al-Aḥnaf, the Banū Tamīm intervened. At the beginning of the month of Shawwāl (64/684), a member of the tribe killed Masʿūd b. ʿAmr.

According to some reports, the reason why members of Banū Tamīm killed Masʿūd b. ʿAmr was an old tribal conflict between the Azd and Tamīm, dating back many years, during which thousands had been killed. This account indicates that Masʿūd b. ʿAmr was killed by a member of the Tamīm tribe. Another report concerning the identity of his killers states that some Khārijites, taking advantage of the prevailing disorder, emerged from hiding and resumed their activities. It is reported that al-Aḥnaf addressed these Khārijites, saying: “The man who has entered that palace is both our enemy and yours; nothing will prevent him from harming you.” In this way, he made Masʿūd b. ʿAmr a target. Thereupon, a group of Khārijites came and shot Masʿūd with an arrow while he was receiving pledges of allegiance in the mosque, killing him.

When the Azd learned of this incident, they killed some of the Khārijites responsible, wounded others, and expelled the remaining ones from Basra. Later, when news reached the Azd that Masʿūd had been killed by the Tamīm, they set out to fight the Tamīm, forming an alliance led by Ziyād b. ʿAmr, the brother of Masʿūd b. ʿAmr, together with members of Rabīʿa under the leadership of Mālik b. Mismaʿ. Fearing the alliance of Azd and Rabīʿa, the Tamīm went to al-Aḥnaf b. Qays—one of the wise men of Basra—and once again sought his help. Al-Aḥnaf set out together with the Banū Tamīm and the Qaysīs of Basra who later joined him. As this conflict escalated into a major tribal war, many people were killed.

Subsequently, the Banū Tamīm declared that they had played no role in the killing of Masʿūd b. ʿAmr and offered blood money (diya) to the Azd. Al-Aḥnaf also apologized to the Azd and requested that the matter be brought to a close. When the Azd demanded diya for ten individuals, a peace agreement was concluded between them and the Tamīm. An examination of these reports leads to the conclusion that, as a result of ʿUbaydullāh b. Ziyād’s flight from Basra, his seeking refuge with Masʿūd b. ʿAmr, and his appointment of Masʿūd as governor of Basra, Masʿūd b. ʿAmr was ultimately killed by members of the Tamīm tribe during the ensuing tribal conflict. The fact that the Azd demanded blood money from the Tamīm and that the latter accepted this demand constitutes the strongest evidence that Masʿūd b. ʿAmr was killed by the Tamīm. For the Azd, accepting this settlement was regarded as a sign of weakness and later became a source of negative reputation among the tribes.

Upon learning that his deputy had been killed, ʿUbaydullāh b. Ziyād fled to Syria. The people of Basra pursued him but were unable to capture him; instead, they looted his possessions. Masʿūd b. ʿAmr had hosted ʿUbaydullāh in his home, and this act of hospitality ultimately cost him his life. ʿUbaydullāh remained in Masʿūd’s house until Masʿūd was killed and until he himself fled to Syria.

From the time he received allegiance in Basra until his flight to Syria, ʿUbaydullāh governed Basra for three months. During this period, the people of Basra were dissatisfied with him. In their view, ʿUbaydullāh neither carried out the duties expected of him nor demonstrated sound judgment. The reason for this was not solely ʿUbaydullāh himself; those around him also failed to carry out his orders. As administrative authority disintegrated, he could no longer command obedience from his subordinates. Following the allegiance taken by Salama b. Zuʾayb on behalf of ʿAbdullāh b. al-Zubayr in Basra, even the troops personally assembled by ʿUbaydullāh abandoned him, revealing the collapse of his influence.

In a speech addressing the Basrans who had pledged allegiance to ʿAbdullāh b. al-Zubayr, ʿUbaydullāh expressed his frustration, stating that his commands were not being executed, his opinions were ignored, his requests were not fulfilled, intermediaries had come between him and his aides, and although he ordered the imprisonment of criminals, tribal leaders intervened, preventing any effective outcome. In this way, ʿUbaydullāh acknowledged that his authority had been undermined. In reality, his authority had rested on the power of the Sufyānid Umayyads; once that power disappeared, so too did his authority. Aware of his weakness and impotence, the people of Basra no longer regarded him as a legitimate ruler. Ultimately, the Basrans succeeded in expelling from Basra the very man to whom they had previously pledged allegiance as caliph: ʿUbaydullāh b. Ziyād.

After his expulsion, Masʿūd b. ʿAmr of the Azd tribe—who had placed ʿUbaydullāh under his protection—dispatched with him a trustworthy guide from the Banū Yashkur, known as Musāfir b. Sharīḥ al-Yashkurī, along with one hundred men, to accompany him until he reached Syria. During this journey, a conversation took place between al-Yashkurī and ʿUbaydullāh b. Ziyād that offers a revealing example of how ʿUbaydullāh reflected upon the events of his governorship of Basra under the Umayyads. Observing that ʿUbaydullāh appeared distracted and was speaking to himself, al-Yashkurī mentioned the matters he believed ʿUbaydullāh was contemplating and regretting: first, that he had not wished to kill al-Ḥusayn; second, that he had killed people he did not wish to kill; third, that he had not wished to build the palace at al-Bayḍāʾ; fourth, that he had not wished to appoint dihqāns to collect land tax and alms; fifth, that he had regretted militarizing people; and sixth, that he had wished to be more generous.

ʿUbaydullāh responded point by point to the matters that al-Yashkurī believed he was contemplating, beginning with al-Ḥusayn. He stated that he had not killed al-Ḥusayn of his own volition; rather, Yazīd had ordered him to do so, and had he refused, Yazīd himself would have killed him. For this reason, he said, he chose to have al-Ḥusayn killed.

Regarding the construction of the palace at al-Bayḍāʾ, he explained that he had purchased it from ʿAbdullāh b. ʿUthmān al-Thaqafī and had spent there the one million dirhams sent to him by Yazīd b. Muʿāwiya. He added that as long as he lived, the palace would belong to him and his family, and that if he were to die, he would not regret it.

Concerning his appointment of Persian dihqāns (local landowners/administrators) to collect zakāt and kharāj, he said:

Because ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Abī Bakra and” Zāzān Farrūkh spoke against me in the presence of Muʿāwiya and portrayed the kharāj revenue of Iraq as amounting to one hundred million, Muʿāwiya left me with the choice of either being dismissed or paying compensation. I did not wish to be dismissed. Whenever I appointed an Arab to collect the kharāj, the revenue declined. Had I demanded compensation either from him or from his tribe due to this loss, their hearts would have become filled with resentment toward me. On the other hand, had I refrained from demanding compensation, I would have neglected God’s property. Since I was fully aware of the value and importance of this wealth, I could not do so. I observed that Persian dihqāns were more discerning and effective in collecting the kharāj, and that they were more easily held accountable than Arabs. Nevertheless, I did not leave the dihqāns unsupervised; I appointed trustworthy men from among you to oversee them, so that no injustice would be committed. Moreover, before me, my father and others had also employed them. I therefore saw no harm in continuing this practice.“

As for the muḥāribūn (armed enforcers), he said that he had employed them solely for protection. They were responsible for executing criminals. Had he entrusted this task to the tribes instead, they would have been unable to carry it out, as it would have been too difficult for them. For this reason, he assigned this duty to armed men who had no kinship ties to those being punished.

Regarding the accusation that he lacked generosity, he stated that he possessed no personal wealth that he could distribute generously. Had he wished, he could have taken property from some and given it to others, or withheld it from certain people. He expressed regret that, when news arrived of the caliph’s death, he had not distributed the contents of the public treasuries (bayt al-māl) in Kūfa and Basra to the people, remarking that had he done so, he would have gained praise and renown among them.

As for the statement that he regretted killing certain individuals, he acknowledged that this was indeed one of his greatest regrets. He declared that he wished he had burned down the prison holding four thousand Khārijites and annihilated them entirely. He added that he would not have been the first to kill the Khārijites, for before him—and better than him—ʿAlī had also fought and killed them.

 Had he done this, he claimed, there would have been no deed, after sincere belief or the profession of divine unity, that would have drawn him closer to God than the killing of the Khārijites.

After responding to the matters attributed to him by al-Yashkurī, ʿUbaydullāh then explained what he himself had been reflecting upon. He told al-Yashkurī that he deeply regretted not having fought the people of Basra. He said that he should have gathered his family members, relatives, and slaves and declared war on the inhabitants of the city, but that he had refrained from doing so—and now bitterly regretted it. He stated that the Basrans had willingly pledged allegiance to him but later withdrew it, and that such behavior should not have gone unpunished.

He explained that he had abandoned this course of action because his brothers had convinced him otherwise, arguing that if the Basrans were to prevail, they would not spare his brothers’ lives, and that it was therefore better not to confront them immediately, but rather to fight them once they had regained strength. Thus, he expressed his remorse. He further stated that, out of concern for his brothers and their children, he had been compelled to act as he did. He added that he should have removed his brothers from Basra before events escalated, but circumstances had unfolded differently, leaving him with a deep sense of moral unease.

Regarding the prisoners, ʿUbaydullāh stated, “I deeply regret that I neither released them nor killed them.” When al-Yashkurī asked him, “Now that you have missed both of these opportunities, what will you do?”, he replied that his only hope was that, before he reached Syria, the people of Syria would not yet have reached a decision. Al-Ṭabarī relates that when ʿUbaydullāh arrived in Syria, indeed no decision had yet been made. According to another report, however, a decision had been reached, but it is said that ʿUbaydullāh disrupted it. Al-Dīnawarī, in his work al-Akhbār, presents a slightly different version of this account, stating that ʿUbaydullāh said: “If I reach Damascus and find that the people have united around a caliph, I shall follow the path they have taken. But if I find that they have not gathered around anyone, then they are like sheep; in that case, I shall turn them whichever way I please.”

Ultimately, ʿUbaydullāh went to Syria expressing regret that, although the people of Basra had pledged allegiance to him and then withdrawn it, he had refrained from fighting them and from killing the Khārijites because he had listened to his brothers’ advice. When he saw that people were divided and had not appointed a leader over themselves, and when he learned that Marwān b. al-Ḥakam was considering going to ʿAbdullāh b. al-Zubayr to pledge allegiance to him, ʿUbaydullāh said to Marwān: “I am ashamed of what you are doing. You are among the elders of Quraysh. Nothing has slipped from our hands. Extend your hand so that I may pledge allegiance to you.”

When we examine the episode of ʿUbaydullāh b. Ziyād’s flight from Basra, it is easy to reach the following conclusion: while serving as governor under the power and authority of Yazīd b. Muʿāwiya, ʿUbaydullāh was able to rule Basra; however, after Yazīd’s death, he was forced to flee the city. His flight demonstrates that he was not loved during his tenure in Basra and that he was able to maintain his position only because the people of Basra feared his rule. Once the opportunity arose, both the Basrans and the Kūfans sought to rid themselves of him. The killing of Masʿūd b. ʿAmr of the Azd—despite the fact that he knowingly risked the anger of the Basrans by hosting ʿUbaydullāh in his home—indicates that ʿUbaydullāh had completely lost authority and control in Basra. His inability to secure support even from his closest commanders and soldiers further demonstrates the loss of his power in the eyes of the populace. Consequently, his attempt to secure allegiance in his own name in Basra ended in failure. This failure stemmed from his misjudgment and erroneous calculations in believing that he could maintain dominance in Iraq independently of the caliphate.

Unable to reconcile his expectations with reality, Ibn Ziyād not only failed in his ambitions but also narrowly escaped the wrath of the Basrans. As the harsh, iron-fisted, authoritarian, and powerful governor of Iraq, ʿUbaydullāh had controlled the turmoil caused by the Khārijites and the Shiʿa with even greater severity and brutality than his father Ziyād, successfully imposing order. As a result of his merciless and harsh governance in Basra, the city was partially cleared of Khārijites. Possessing a tyrannical character and employing every means—confiscation of property, torture, and killing—to secure state authority, ʿUbaydullāh was beyond accountability. The Umayyads trusted him because they knew that his judgments, decisions, and actions were carried out to preserve and sustain their rule. He was the confidant and most trusted man of Caliph Yazīd b. Muʿāwiya, concerned with nothing other than protecting and consolidating Umayyad power.

Described in historical sources with attributes such as malicious and resentful, excessively audacious, tyrannical, oppressive, rebellious, and inhumane; a source of evil and sedition; a man of worldly rather than religious concerns; and someone who employed rhetorical distortion and falsehood due to his sharp intellect, ʿUbaydullāh favored an emirate founded upon coercion. He left a lasting negative legacy due to his role in the killing of al-Ḥusayn.

 As Şaban Öz observes in his Turkish book “The Power Struggle After the Companions”, the allegiance secured by ʿUbaydullāh—intended to preserve lasting power and to avoid plunging the city into internal conflict by maintaining its economic, social, and even religious dynamics—ultimately failed to safeguard authority. Instead, it dragged the city into internal strife and rekindled inter-tribal warfare.

1.5. The Consequences of ʿUbaydullāh b. Ziyād’s Basra Initiative

With the death of Yazīd b. Muʿāwiya and the subsequent abdication of Muʿāwiya b. Yazīd from the caliphate, the stable administrative order in Basra was disrupted. In the wake of the ensuing governance crisis, ʿUbaydullāh b. Ziyād sought to become governor independently, without allegiance to any established authority. Although the people of Basra pledged allegiance to him for a short time, they later withdrew this pledge, as explained above. The removal of ʿUbaydullāh from the administration of Basra produced a number of consequences, both for himself and for the people of Basra:

1. After the Basrans withdrew their allegiance, ʿUbaydullāh considered waging war against them. However, thanks to the foresight of his brother ʿAbdullāh, a large-scale conflict was narrowly averted. Sound-minded individuals thus prevented an action that would have resulted in the deaths of thousands.

2. Since ʿUbaydullāh’s authority depended on the power to which he was attached, once he lost that power he became an unwanted figure and was forced to seek refuge with the Azd tribe.

3. The Azd tribe’s protection of ʿUbaydullāh and his appointment of Masʿūd b. ʿAmr as governor while fleeing Basra displeased other tribes. As a result—particularly due to the reaction of the Tamīm—intertribal unrest re-emerged, ultimately leading to the killing of Masʿūd b. ʿAmr. Long-dormant tribal conflicts were thus rekindled.

4. Driven by personal ambition yet ultimately unsuccessful, ʿUbaydullāh was deeply affected by his expulsion from Basra. Out of anger toward the Basrans, he turned toward Syria and offered the caliphate to Marwān b. al-Ḥakam—who had been considering pledging allegiance to ʿAbdullāh b. al-Zubayr—thereby paving the way for the re-establishment of Umayyad rule.

5. Failing to receive from the Basrans the recognition and appreciation he believed he deserved, ʿUbaydullāh clearly chose his side and provided his strongest support for Marwān b. al-Ḥakam’s accession to the caliphate. Through his endorsement of Marwān, the Umayyad state preserved its place in history under the Marwānid line.

6. At a time when the people of Syria were about to pledge allegiance to ʿAbdullāh b. al-Zubayr, ʿUbaydullāh’s promotion of Marwān resulted in the emergence of a dual authority within Islamic lands. While ensuring the continuation of the Umayyad state through the Marwānids, ʿUbaydullāh simultaneously contributed to Iraq falling under the control of ʿAbdullāh b. al-Zubayr.

7. Through his efforts to bring Marwān b. al-Ḥakam to the caliphate, ʿUbaydullāh clearly demonstrated that he was not—and would never be—aligned with ʿAbdullāh b. al-Zubayr.

8. Reaffirming his loyalty to the Umayyads, ʿUbaydullāh continued to serve them as a military commander even if he no longer held a governorship, ultimately sacrificing his life in their cause.

9. The people of Basra, dissatisfied with ʿUbaydullāh’s past practices—especially his role in the Karbalāʾ incident and his brutal policies toward opponents—were unwilling to grant him another opportunity and therefore pledged allegiance to ʿAbdullāh b. al-Zubayr.

10. ʿUbaydullāh’s struggle to secure the governorship of Basra once again sowed the seeds of discord among the Basrans.

11. With ʿUbaydullāh’s departure from the city, a new administrative crisis emerged. For the Basrans, who attempted to continue by selecting a governor from among themselves, the situation reached an intractable level.

12. ʿAbdullāh b. al-Ḥārith, whom the Basrans chose from among themselves as governor, failed to assert effective leadership on behalf of Basra and proved unsuccessful in combating the Khārijites.

 Realizing that it was impossible to confront the Khārijites and establish stability in the city without the backing of a strong political authority, the Basrans ultimately found salvation in uniting around a new leader. These developments led them to pledge allegiance to ʿAbdullāh b. al-Zubayr, from which he ultimately emerged as the beneficiary.

2. ʿAbdullāh b. Ḥārith, the Governor Chosen from Among the People of Basra

Rejoicing at having been freed from ʿUbaydullāh b. Ziyād and Umayyad domination, the people of Basra decided to continue their affairs by appointing a ruler from among themselves. However, the departure of ʿUbaydullāh b. Ziyād from Basra did not resolve the administrative vacuum that emerged after the death of Yazīd b. Muʿāwiya; rather, disagreements arose among the populace. Consequently, the Basran tribes and clans convened and appointed as their governor ʿAbdullāh b. Ḥārith, known as Babba.

ʿAbdullāh b. Ḥārith was the son of Nawfal b. al-Ḥārith b. ʿAbd al-Muṭṭalib b. Hāshim, and his mother was Hind b. Abī Sufyān b. Ḥarb b. Umayya. His kunya was Abū Muḥammad, and he was known by the nickname Babba. ʿAbdullāh b. al-Ḥārith had gone to Basra with his father, where they acquired a house for themselves. When the revolt associated with Masʿūd b. ʿAmr emerged and ʿUbaydullāh b. Ziyād fled Basra, the ensuing discord among the people prompted the tribes and clans to appoint ʿAbdullāh b. Ḥārith as their governor.

According to reports, after ʿUbaydullāh was expelled from Basra, the Basrans initially appointed Nuʿmān b. Ṣuḥbān al-Rāsibī and Qays b. al-Haytham as representatives tasked with selecting an amīr for them. Qays favored ʿAbdullāh b. al-Aswad al-Zuhrī, whereas Nuʿmān b. Ṣuḥbān preferred ʿAbdullāh b. Ḥārith b. Nawfal b. al-Ḥārith b. ʿAbd al-Muṭṭalib b. Hāshim, known as Babba. However, they failed to reach a consensus. 

Nuʿmān—reported to have been a Shiʿite and to have participated alongside ʿAlī in the Battle of Ṣiffīn—argued for the appointment of ʿAbdullāh b. Ḥārith by emphasizing his Hāshimite lineage and kinship ties with the Umayyads. Through a fait accompli, he installed Babba in the governor’s palace. When this appointment was rejected by the leading figures of Basra, yet another atmosphere of chaos emerged in the city.

Taking advantage of this disorder, the Khārijites once again mobilized. As the fighting with the Khārijites intensified, it is reported that Babba failed to carry out his duties, remained in his house, and refrained from intervening in affairs, appointing only Ḥimyān b. ʿAdī al-Sadūsī as head of the Basran police (shurṭa). With no strong authority in place after ʿUbaydullāh’s flight, the renewed Khārijite activity compelled the popularly chosen governor, ʿAbdullāh b. Ḥārith, to appoint Muslim b. ʿUbayth al-Qurashī as commander. The Basrans set out with Muslim and five thousand cavalry. In a fierce battle at a place called Dūlāb, Muslim b. ʿUbayth was killed, and his forces were defeated.

Gripped by fear, the Basrans then appointed ʿUthmān b. Maʿmar al-Qurashī as their leader and assigned him ten thousand infantrymen. With these troops, ʿUthmān pursued the Khārijites and encountered them in a place called Fārs, where fighting ensued. 

In this engagement, ʿUthmān was killed and his soldiers were defeated as well. According to Ibn al-Athīr, following these events and his inability to confront the Khārijites, and as tribal rivalries intensified, ʿAbdullāh b. Ḥārith voluntarily relinquished the governorship of Basra and departed from the city.

Left to confront the Khārijites on their own and repeatedly failing, the Basrans realized that governance by a leader chosen from among themselves was insufficient. They therefore wrote to ʿAbdullāh b. al-Zubayr, informing him that they were without a leader and requesting that he send them someone to assume their administration.

 ʿAbdullāh b. al-Zubayr dispatched al-Ḥārith b. ʿAbdullāh b. Abī Rabīʿa al-Makhzūmī to them. Upon arriving in Basra and taking control of the administration, al-Ḥārith consulted with the city’s leading figures regarding whom they should appoint to fight the Khārijites. In accordance with their counsel, he selected al-Muhallab b. Abī Ṣufra. With al-Muhallab’s success in this role, Basra enjoyed a period of relative stability.

Conclusion

In the absence of a strong political authority following the death of Yazīd b. Muʿāwiya, ʿUbaydullāh b. Ziyād embarked upon an individual struggle for power—first in Basra and then in Kūfa—but ultimately failed in this endeavor. Although, while receiving allegiance, he declared that people should pledge allegiance to his authority only until they agreed upon a caliph, his subsequent attempt to obtain allegiance from the Kūfans after the Basrans revealed his true intention: first to seize control of the Iraqi region and, once sufficiently strengthened, to extend his authority to other parts of the state. 

What appeared outwardly as a power struggle devoid of personal ambition was in fact a concealed bid for the caliphate, the true nature of which became evident through the unfolding of events over time.

ʿUbaydullāh’s caliphal aspirations in Basra turned into a nightmare for himself and a source of chaos for the people of Basra. His miscalculated initiative led to the loss of Iraq from Umayyad control and enabled Ibn al-Zubayr to rule the region for nine years. By securing the allegiance first of the Basrans and then of the Kūfans, ʿAbdullāh b. al-Zubayr expanded his sphere of authority and brought Iraq under his control. In this sense, ʿUbaydullāh’s actions proved self-defeating, effectively bringing his career as an administrator to an end.

Although ʿUbaydullāh was successful from the Umayyad perspective in the struggle between power and opposition in administrative, political, and military domains, and played a major role in Marwān b. al-Ḥakam’s accession to the caliphate—thus ensuring the continuation of Umayyad rule outside Iraq—he was never again entrusted with an administrative office during the reigns of either Marwān or ʿAbd al-Malik. 

The likely reason for this was that he was instead deployed as a military commander to fight those who had humiliated him in Basra, driven by a desire for vengeance. The Basra episode escalated to such an extent that even Masʿūd b. ʿAmr, a prominent leader of the Azd tribe, lost his life. ʿUbaydullāh’s struggle for power in Basra only intensified unrest and further complicated events.

Those who opposed ʿUbaydullāh’s governorship in Basra chose a governor from among themselves; however, the appointment of an indifferent and incompetent figure through fait accompli left Basra vulnerable to the threat posed by the Khārijites. Thus, while attempting to resolve the administrative crisis, the Basrans also faced the danger of the city falling into Khārijite hands.

 As a result of these developments, the people of Basra came to realize that choosing individual governors was a mistaken approach and that, without a solid political authority—that is, without a state—they were incapable of governing the city on their own. Consequently, they declared their allegiance to ʿAbdullāh b. al-Zubayr.

Through this process, the administration of Basra passed into the hands of ʿAbdullāh b. al-Zubayr and simultaneously slipped out of Umayyad control. ʿUbaydullāh’s actions disrupted unity and solidarity in Basra and created an environment conducive to intertribal conflict. 

Beyond this, by exploiting the uncertainties faced by the Syrian administration, ʿUbaydullāh played a crucial role in encouraging Marwān b. al-Ḥakam to put himself forward as a candidate for the caliphate, thereby contributing significantly to the continuation of the caliphate under the Marwānid line. In doing so, he once again chose to submit himself to the authority of the Umayyad dynasty.

:SOURCES 

Balādhurī — Ansāb al-Ashrāf

Balādhurī — Futūḥ al-Buldān

Dīnawarī — al-Akhbār al-Ṭiwāl

Khalīfa b. Khayyāṭ — al-Tārīkh

Ibn Aʿtham — al-Futūḥ

Ibn al-Jawzī — al-Muntaẓam fī Tārīkh al-Mulūk wa-l-Umam

Ibn al-Athīr — Usd al-Ghāba fī Maʿrifat al-Ṣaḥāba

Ibn al-Athīr — al-Kāmil fī al-Tārīkh

Ibn Kathīr — al-Bidāya wa-l-Nihāya

Ibn Qutayba — al-Maʿārif

Ibn Qutayba — al-Imāma wa-l-Siyāsa

Ibn Saʿd — al-Ṭabaqāt al-Kubrā

Ibn al-ʿImād — Shadharāt al-Dhahab fī Akhbār man Dhahab

Sibt Ibn al-Jawzī — Mirʾāt al-Zamān fī Tawārīkh al-Aʿyān

Ṭabarī — Tārīkh al-Rusul wa-l-Mulūk

Yaʿqūbī — Tārīkh al-Yaʿqūbī

Yāqūt al-Ḥamawī — Muʿjam al-Buldān

Dhahabī — Siyar Aʿlām al-Nubalāʾ

Dhahabī — Tārīkh al-Islām

Ziriklī — al-Aʿlām

Öz, Şaban — The Struggle for Power after the Companions

Watt, W. Montgomery — The Formative Period of Islamic Thought

Wellhausen, Julius — The Arab Kingdom and Its Fall

Ṣallābī, ʿAlī Muḥammad — The Umayyad State: Factors of Prosperity and Causes of Decline

Baydūn, Ibrāhīm — Features of Political Currents in the First Hijrī Century

Muḥammad Ḥuḍarī Bek — Lectures on Islamic History: The Umayyad State

Ṭāhir Jalīl al-Ḥabūs — The Companions of al-Burāq in the Land of Iraq