Tribal Migration and State Policy: A Study of the Rawādif Phenomenon and Its Socio-Economic Impact and Political Role in Reshaping Society and Governance in Basra and Kufa (14–60 AH / 635–680 CE)

"Al-Rawadif" is a historical term that appeared in Islamic sources, and its use became widespread from the beginning of the conquests in the Rashidun era until the Umayyad period. The term refers to the successive migrations of different branches of the same tribe, at different times, to one of the newly founded garrison cities (amṣār).

The newly established cities during the Rashidun period—Basra, Kufa, and Fustat (Egypt)—suffered from this phenomenon. These migrations placed social and economic burdens on both the tribes already settled there and on the cities receiving the newcomers.

 Tribal leaders and governors had to find urgent new solutions in terms of settlement and financial resources in order to provide acceptable living conditions, in comparison to the tribal branches that had been settled since the founding of the cities. This involved distributing stipends and provisions, granting land, and giving them the privileges enjoyed by residents of Iraq and other regions.

The discontent of this group was exploited in revolts and political opposition against governors and caliphs, and they became its fuel.

Accordingly, this study aims to shed light on the phenomenon of al-Rawadif in the cities of Basra and Kufa, the challenges and problems that accompanied it, and how the successive governors of Iraq dealt with it—and to what extent they succeeded. The study is divided into two sections:

1. The First section discusses the problem of al-Rawadif in the Rashidun era.
2. The Second section addresses the issue during the Umayyad period.

The Problem of al-Rawadif in the Rashidun Era

During the caliphate of Abu Bakr al-Siddiq (11–13 AH / 632–634 CE), the early Islamic state began to focus on expanding its territories and spheres of influence. It entered into wars with the two greatest empires of the time: the Persian and Byzantine empires. 

Fighting on these two powerful fronts simultaneously made the task difficult for the newly established state, which had not yet fully recovered from the effects of the Ridda (apostasy) wars and the resulting division and fragmentation among the Arab tribes.

Caliph Abu Bakr took an important step to contain the Arab tribes that had rebelled, bringing them back under the authority of the state and directing them to fight the Byzantines in the Levant and the Persians in Iraq. Al-Muthanna al-Shaybani, chief of the Shayban tribe, convinced him to make use of those who had shown repentance and regret, specifically on the Iraqi front, but Abu Bakr did not allow it.

When ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb assumed the caliphate (13–23 AH / 634–643 CE), a new phase began. He fully understood the importance of relying on the military skills and capabilities of the Arab tribes to reinforce the Muslim armies in the Levant and Iraq. The first tribe to join the Iraqi front was the Bajila tribe. After them followed the tribes of Azd, Dabba, Kinana, Rabiʿa, Jusham, Khathʿam, and finally ʿAbd al-Qays, Tayy, Ghatafan, Qays, Asad, and Qays ʿAylan.

We find that the Iraqi front required Caliph ʿUmar to call upon the tribes of Rabīʿa and Muḍar—first, because their homelands were geographically close to Iraq, and second, because the tribes of Rabīʿa and Tamīm were already familiar with fighting the Persians, having conducted raids along the Iraqi frontier during the pre-Islamic period. To reinforce the Iraqi front, ʿUmar also supplied them with support from some Yemeni tribes—Madhḥij, Kindah, Hamdān, and Murād. 

The arrival of the Yemeni tribes, however, was delayed due to the distance of their territories from Iraq, as well as their preference for joining the Syrian front, where many Yemeni tribes had already long been present.

Thus, the Arab tribes that had not apostatized and had participated in the early military campaigns in Iraq before the Battle of al-Qādisiyya were known as Ahl al-Ayyām (“the People of the Early Battles”). Meanwhile, the tribes that had rebelled and later rejoined the army to participate in al-Qādisiyya were known as Ahl al-Qādisiyya (“the People of al-Qādisiyya”).

After al-Qādisiyya, the rawādif (successive tribal arrivals) began to flow into Iraq in increasing numbers. The conquests led to the founding of Basra in 14 AH / 635 CE and Kufa in 17 AH / 638 CE, which soon developed into settled cities with an established Arab tribal society. They became major destinations for tribes migrating from Arabia in search of permanent settlement—especially after the influx of wealth from the newly conquered eastern territories. 

These cities became attractive to tribes that had not participated in the original conquests of Iraq. These latecomers were called al-Rawādif, referring to the Bedouins who arrived in Kufa and Basra at a late stage, with no prior record of participation in jihad or contribution to the initial conquests.

The rawādif were divided into four groups according to the dates of their arrival and participation in military campaigns: a first, second, third, and fourth raddifa.

The growing number of rawādif arriving in Iraq caused overcrowding among the tribes settled in their designated districts (khiṭaṭ) in Basra and Kufa. Al-Ṭabarī states in his Tarikh (History):

“When the rawādif joined them—the first and the second waves—and their numbers increased, the housing plots became too narrow for the people. Whoever had many followers from the rawādif would move to them and leave his own district. Whoever had only a few rawādif assigned to him would settle them in the houses of those who had moved away, if they were their neighbors; otherwise, they would make space for their rawādif by narrowing their own living space.”

We find that the situation worsened further, as the value of the stipends (ʿaṭāʾ) granted to each group of rawādif differed from one another according to two main criteria:

1. The time of their migration (i.e., whether it was before or after the Battle of al-Qādisiyya, in which the Muslims faced great difficulty in conquering Iraq—whereas those who migrated after al-Qādisiyya arrived only after the Persian threat had ended and the conquest was complete).

2. Their role in jihad and the degree of participation in the conquests.

Thus, the stipends granted to the rawādif ranged between 500 dirhams at most and 200 dirhams at minimum, which were very small amounts compared to other categories. For example:

• The veterans of Badr from among the Muhājirūn of Quraysh, the Arabs, and their clients received 5,000 dirhams.

• The Anṣār and their clients received 4,000 dirhams.

• Those who participated in al-Qādisiyya received between 2,000 and 3,000 dirhams.

• Caliph ʿUmar fixed the stipend of the first group of rawādif at 250 dirhams in the spring distributions.

• Those who came after them, including the people of Hajar and al-ʿAbbād, were assigned 200 dirhams.

The disparity in the value of stipends created a hierarchical, almost class-like structure within early Islamic Arab society:

those who received the higher stipends grew increasingly wealthy, while those with lower stipends remained in modest—or even poor—living conditions. This produced a social and economic crisis, embodied in the problem of the rawādif, who sought to improve their financial status and raise their social standing to match others in the communities of Basra and Kufa.

Thus, the rawādif became one of the major challenges faced by the Rashidun Caliphate in Iraq.

The Rawādif of Basra

Only a few tribes settled in Basra—compared to Kufa—among them Rabīʿa, Tamīm, al-Azd, and a mixture of Hijazi tribes. This was because most of Basra’s land consisted of salty marshes (sabākh) due to its proximity to the sea, and drinkable water was scarce. The arable lands of Basra were ʿushrī (subject to one-tenth taxation), and most of them were distributed among the soldiers on the condition that one-fifth of their revenue would be returned to the state treasury in Medina. As for the lands surrounding Basra, they were uncultivated wastelands and salt flats that required both effort and money to reclaim.

The people of Basra complained to Caliph ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb about their limited economic resources and the increasing number of rawādif—Bedouins who had remained in their original homelands in Arabia during the early conquests, and who later migrated to Basra. 

What encouraged these Bedouin tribes to migrate was that ʿUmar granted stipends (ʿaṭāʾ) to the inhabitants of the cities but did not grant them to the nomadic tribes of the desert. Thus, obtaining a semi-regular financial allowance from the state became one of the main reasons that drove these rawādif to join their already-settled tribal branches in Basra—especially since Basra was close to the Arabian desert. This led to a shortage of material resources in the city and an increase in the number of those in need.

 So the people of Basra demanded either higher stipends or permission to go on military campaigns in Persia in order to improve their economic conditions through conquest, acquiring new lands, and increasing Basra’s public revenue from war booty, land tax (kharāj), and tribute (jizya).

The eastern land borders of Iraq were unstable and open to multiple fronts inhabited by diverse peoples of various ethnicities and religions. After the fall of the Sasanian state in Iraq in 14 AH / 635 CE, the Arab conquerors needed to annex the rest of its provinces—regions such as al-Jibāl, Rayy, Gurgān, Ṭabaristān, Qohistān, Khurāsān, Fārs, Kirmān, Makrān, and Sijistān. Caliph ʿUmar therefore allowed them to continue the conquests into Persia in 17 AH / 638 CE, and a group of Basra’s noble leaders were placed in command of the armies. Among them were:

• Al-Aḥnaf ibn Qays, commander of the Khurāsān campaign

• Mujāshiʿ ibn Masʿūd al-Sulamī, commander of Sābūr

• ʿUthmān ibn Abī al-ʿĀṣ, commander of Iṣṭakhr

• Sāriya ibn Zunīm, commander of Kirmān

• ʿĀṣim ibn ʿUmar and Suhayl ibn ʿAdī, commanders of Sijistān

The notables of Basra and Kufa later disputed before ʿUmar over control of some of these Persian provinces—because of their great economic importance in increasing the revenues of their respective garrison cities through kharāj, jizya, spoils of war, and new agricultural lands.

The fighting men from among the rawādif were added to the stipend registers during the governorship of Abū Mūsā al-Ashʿarī (17–23 AH / 638–643 CE), with each receiving 2,000 dirhams. However, this stipend was granted only to the settled urban population (ahl al-ḥāḍira), which likely motivated many Bedouins to migrate in large numbers to Basra—especially due to its proximity to the Arabian desert. Thus, the influx of rawādif into Basra began at an early stage.

By 22 AH / 642 CE, the number of fighters in Basra increased as a result of the improved financial conditions of the rawādif there. This helped sustain the continuation of the conquests in Khurāsān from the late years of ʿUmar’s caliphate into the early years of ʿUthmān ibn ʿAffān’s rule (23–35 AH / 643–655 CE). It also helped prevent any major disparity in stipends among the rawādif of Basra, as they benefited from the spoils of war, which improved their economic and living conditions.

However, the problem did not disappear. When the conquests slowed down and the number of rawādif increased, their incomes and stipends remained fixed—especially in Kufa. This stagnation became one of the factors behind the unrest in Kufa during the caliphate of ʿUthmān ibn ʿAffān.

Basra witnessed major developments during the governorship of ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿĀmir (25–35 AH / 645–655 CE) on the political, economic, and social levels. New groups of rawādif from Arab tribes continued to arrive, and the Bakr ibn Wāʾil tribe was among the earliest to migrate to Basra. This was likely connected to the participation of one of its branches—the Banū Shaybān—under the leadership of al-Muthannā ibn al-Ḥāritha in the early campaigns against the Persians in southern Iraq.

It appears that their migration was organized and intended for permanent settlement, beginning in 16 AH / 637 CE under the leadership of Suwayd ibn Qaḥṭaba. The closeness of their original territories to al-Ubulla—near Basra—facilitated the migration of many Bakrite tribes, including Shaybān, ʿIjl, Riqāsh, Sadūs, Jaḥdar, Ḥanīfa, Ḍubayʿa, Yashkur, ʿAnaza, Taym al-Lāt ibn Thaʿlaba, Taym Shaybān, and Dhuhl Shaybān.

It is likely that they settled in the central, northern, and northeastern districts (khiṭaṭ) of Basra.

The tribe of Bakr ibn Wāʾil was followed in its migration to Basra by the tribe of Tamīm, which soon rivaled Bakr in shaping the demographic structure of the city due to its larger numbers and the proximity of its original homeland to the desert regions near Basra. Tamīm had already migrated in the pre-Islamic period from al-Yamāma, Hajar, and Bahrain to southern Iraq. Among the Tamīmī clans that settled in Basra were: Banū Saʿd, Banū ʿAnbar, Banū Mālik, Banū Mujāshiʿ, Nahshal, al-Hujaym, al-Faqīm, al-Ghadan, Māzin, al-Hijriyyūn, Banū ʿAsal, and Banū al-ʿAm. Their settlement districts (khiṭaṭ) extended from the western side of Basra to its southern outskirts.

As for the tribe of al-Azd—the only Yemeni tribe to settle in Basra—they arrived at an early stage of the city’s foundation, but in small numbers, settling in the heart of the city and its eastern side. Later, additional groups from Azd arrived as rawādif, including the clans of:

•  al-ʿAtīk 
• al-Ḥadān
• Zahrān
• Ṭāḥiya
• Juhḍum
• al-ʿAwqa
•  al-Shaqra
•  Qaṭīʿa
•  Jābir
•  al-Ḥurqa
• and Sharīk.

 The increase in their population eventually led them to establish new settlement areas on the outskirts of Basra, particularly in the southwestern part of the city.

Another major raddifa came from the tribe of ʿAbd al-Qays, which migrated in large numbers from Bahrain to Basra. In the pre-Islamic period, ʿAbd al-Qays had lived in Tihāma, but due to tribal conflict with Rabīʿa, they were forced to migrate to Bahrain, and from there they later moved again to Basra. Bahrain had served as a strategic base for the early Islamic armies advancing into the Gulf and the East, but when that military role was transferred to Basra, the city rose in importance and became the administrative center responsible for distributing stipends to the Arabs of Bahrain. This strengthened the connection between Basra and Bahrain and encouraged further migration of ʿAbd al-Qays to Basra, accompanied by additional branches of the Azd tribe.

It is noteworthy that ʿAbd al-Qays had been in a rivalry for leadership in Bahrain with Bakr ibn Wāʾil. The nobles of ʿAbd al-Qays had shown strong enthusiasm for Islam and did not apostatize during the Ridda wars, remaining loyal under the leadership of al-Jārūd al-ʿAbdī during the caliphate of Abū Bakr. Bakr ibn Wāʾil, on the other hand, had enjoyed good relations with the Lakhmid kings of al-Ḥīra in pre-Islamic times, and their chiefs displayed a clear sense of pride that made them reluctant to submit to a caliph from Quraysh of the Muḍar branch.

We find that some clans of the ʿAbd al-Qays tribe that had participated in the early conquests settled in Kufa when it was first founded. As for the clans that migrated to Basra during the caliphate of ʿUthmān ibn ʿAffān, they were: Muḥārib, Ẓafar, ʿAwn, Ṣabāḥ, Nafara, and Shan. They appear to have been few in number, as they shared the same khiṭṭa (residential district) with the tribe of Bakr ibn Wāʾil, located between the Maʿqil River and the Dār al-Rizq—that is, in the northeastern outskirts of Basra.

Beginning in 31 AH / 651 CE, ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿĀmir worked to resume Islamic expansion in the eastern regions—Fars, Sijistān, Kirmān, and Khurāsān. By the time of ʿUthmān ibn ʿAffān, the Muslims had already conquered the lands stretching between Iraq and the Oxus River (Jayḥūn). Military expansion continued in the provinces under the authority of Basra until the end of ʿUthmān’s caliphate, which increased the city’s revenues through spoils of war, kharāj lands, and new territories. Here it is notable that the rawādif played an important role in assisting Ibn ʿĀmir in enlarging the lands under Basran control—bringing about economic prosperity, encouraging trade, and expanding agricultural reclamation.

Ibn ʿĀmir was known for his interest in agriculture, from which he amassed great wealth. He possessed expertise in reclaiming dead land (arāḍī al-mawāt), and owned a date-palm orchard near Kufa. One of his most important agricultural projects was the digging of Nahr al-Ubulla, a canal running through the residential areas of Basra, providing its people with fresh drinking water. He also dug another canal named after his mother—“Nahr Umm ʿAbd Allāh”—which she donated to the people of Basra, who had long suffered from a scarcity of clean water for drinking and irrigation.

Afterward, many small canals were dug in Basra, each named after its landowning patron, who had financed its construction for irrigation purposes. Since Basran land was ʿushrī (taxed at one-tenth) and easy to acquire due to wealth gained from the conquests, many people invested in building estates and reclaiming barren land, converting it into private agricultural holdings.

In addition to this, Ibn ʿĀmir had grown up in the commercial environment of Mecca, which strengthened his interest in trade. He openly declared his ambition:

 “If I had the means, a woman could travel in her howdah every day from water source to marketplace until she reached Mecca.”

He also purchased several houses in Basra, demolished them, and built upon their land the main marketplace of Basra, located in the center of the city on the riverbank, which facilitated the transport of goods by water directly into the market. Beside it stood Sūq al-Murayyid, a market specializing in livestock—camels, horses, and cattle—located near the desert.

The Rawādif of Kufa

The city of Kufa was founded (muṣṣirat) in 17 AH / 638 CE in central Iraq. It was distinguished by its favorable geographic location on the eastern bank of the Euphrates, with pleasant air and fresh water. Most Arab tribes preferred to settle in Kufa because it was located in al-Sawād, the richest agricultural region of Iraq. Kufa became known for the large number of Arab tribes that settled there from Yemen, Rabīʿa, and Muḍar, to the point that ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb described it as:

 “The skull of the Arabs and the head of Islam.”

From the beginning, Kufa was divided according to tribal organization: between the Yemeni tribes and the Adnanite tribes. They drew lots to determine settlement zones on the eastern side of the city—closer to the waters of the Euphrates, which meant easier access to drinking water. This side was allotted to the Yemeni tribes, while the Adnanite tribes settled on the western side.

The Yemeni tribes Hamdan and Bajila occupied the northeastern part of Kufa. The tribes of Madhḥij, Kinda, and al-Azd established their districts south of the mosque on the western side of the city. Little information is found in the sources regarding the specific clans of al-Azd that settled in Kufa. Nor do the sources mention the settlement districts of some Yemeni tribes such as Tayyʾ, despite their strong military and political presence in the Battles of al-Qādisiyya and Ṣiffīn.

The same applies to the tribe of Khathʿam, which took part in major historical events in Kufa, including the uprising of Ḥijr ibn ʿAdī and the revolt of al-Mukhtār al-Thaqafī. It is likely that they settled in the northwestern part of the city.

The Adnanite tribes also settled in Kufa. The tribes of Sulaym and Thaqīf shared one district, while Taym al-Lāt and Taghlib settled together in a district located in the southeastern part of the city. The tribe of Rabīʿa settled in the northern and northwestern areas. The tribe of Asad established itself in the northwestern part of Kufa; they settled there in large numbers due to the city’s proximity to their original homeland in Najd. They were given an independent district, and even shared settlement space with the tribe of Madhḥij in the northwestern area, and with Banū ʿĀmir in the west.

The Anṣār and Muzayna shared one district. The tribes of Tamīm and Muḥārib settled in western Kufa. Ḍubba settled in the south, while Jadīla and Juhayna were assigned a separate district in the same southern area. Later, a raddifa (wave of newcomers) from the tribe of ʿAbd al-Qays migrated from Bahrain to both Kufa and Basra. In Kufa, they settled together with Ḥamrāʾ Dīlam and the people of Hajar, under the leadership of Zuhra ibn Ḥawiyya al-Saʿdī, who came from a noble lineage. It is likely that they lived in the far northwestern district, while also sharing settlement space with the tribe of Qays in southeastern Kufa.

The economic situation of Kufa was better than that of Basra, due to the fertility of its lands and the abundance of fresh water. However, the ʿushrī lands (those that Muslims were allowed to own and pay one-tenth tax on) were few. Most of Kufa’s land was kharāj land, owned by the native inhabitants (al-Nabāṭ), who paid kharāj (land tax) to the state treasury. These lands were left as a permanent endowment (waqf) for all Muslims and were not divided among the soldiers of Kufa. The kharāj and jizya collected from these lands served as a stable source of income for the state, used to pay stipends to the people of the garrison cities and the soldiers stationed on the frontiers.

This means that the revenue from Kufa’s fertile lands—estimated in the time of ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb at one hundred million dirhams—did not go directly to the people of Kufa, but instead flowed back to the central treasury in Medina.

Another issue that arose was that of the ṣawāfī lands—state-owned estates whose annual yield amounted to six million dirhams. These lands were under the sole authority of the caliph, who could allocate them as grants or convert them into private estates, while collecting the one-tenth tax from their new owners.

The ownership of conquered land became a new source of wealth and a stable financial resource, marking a turning point in the economic life of the early Islamic state—especially after the vast and fertile territories of Iraq came under Muslim control. Caliph ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, acting in the public interest, therefore placed restrictions on granting land ownership, setting specific conditions to ensure that the revenues would remain available for future generations rather than being monopolized by a particular group, which would have resulted in the enrichment of a small elite within the Muslim community.

During the caliphate of ʿUthmān ibn ʿAffān, Kufa experienced a major crisis: the problem of the rawādif, which carried both economic and social implications. The increasing migration from Arabia to Kufa placed heavy pressure on the city’s financial resources, which—by all indications—were no longer sufficient to meet local needs, especially since the opportunities for conquest and war booty were limited. 

Basra, on the other hand, had already solved this issue by expanding its conquests into Persia and using the revenue from spoils to improve its economic conditions, after facing a similar shortage of resources and increase in rawādif during the time of ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb.

The number of fighters (muqātila) in Kufa was around 10,000, with each man going out on campaign only once every four years. As a result, the financial returns from warfare were low compared to Basra, and this was due to two main reasons:

1. The large number of fighters in Kufa reduced the individual share of spoils.

2. The limited scope of military expansion available to Kufa.

Under the governorship of al-Walīd ibn ʿUqba (25–30 AH / 645–650 CE), some campaigns did take place in al-Ray and Azerbaijan, and the Kufans also participated in fighting the Byzantines on the Syrian frontier with an army of 8,000 men led by Salmān al-Bāhilī.

Some nobles of the tribe of Rabīʿa began demanding an increase in their stipends, as they were smaller than those of others. ʿUthmān responded by raising their ʿaṭāʾ by 500 dirhams. They also complained about the dominance of the tribe of Kindah, led by al-Ashʿath ibn Qays, who monopolized revenues and army leadership in the eastern conquests. ʿUthmān removed him from office and transferred authority to Rabīʿa, specifically to the descendants of Mudhḥij.

One of the reasons for al-Walīd ibn ʿUqba’s dismissal was that he granted stipends to the slave-born and freedmen, against the wishes of the Kufans. The stipends of many remained unchanged, resulting in unequal payments—and this became one of the causes of political unrest in Kufa.

Saʿīd ibn al-ʿĀṣ (30–34 AH / 650–655 CE) succeeded al-Walīd as governor. He led a campaign against Ṭabaristān in 30 AH / 650 CE, but the material conditions of Kufa did not improve; in fact, the problem of the rawādif worsened. He still had to provide housing plans (khiṭaṭ) for the newcomers and deal with the increasing competition between them and the established residents over land and property.

Saʿīd wrote to Caliph ʿUthmān complaining:

 “The affairs of the people of Kufa have become disorderly. The nobles and respected households have been overwhelmed, for the land is dominated by newcomers—rawādif who arrived later and Bedouins who have joined them—so that no regard is given to the men of noble status, whether they are old settlers or new arrivals.”

The economic and social situation in Kufa at that time was undergoing a severe crisis, namely the problem of the rawādif, which carried both economic and social consequences. The increased migration from Arabia to Kufa placed a heavy burden on the city’s financial resources, which—by all indications—were no longer sufficient to meet the needs of its people, especially since the scope for conquest and the acquisition of war booty had become limited.

The Arab conquerors preferred to remain within the former borders of the Sasanian state and not go beyond them, so as not to come into conflict with numerous peoples, diverse ethnic groups, and vast territories that would be difficult to control. They instead chose to focus on consolidating Islamic authority in Khurasan. However, these regions rebelled and broke away from Muslim rule during the period of the First Fitna (civil war).

From the course of events, it is clear that the rawādif became fertile ground for opposition to ʿUthmān, largely because of their economic grievances: their stipends were small due to their late arrival in Iraq and their lack of participation in the early conquests. They found support in the rhetoric of the opposition, which criticized the wealth of the Companions and the elite, as well as the financial policies of the governor Saʿīd ibn al-ʿĀṣ, who was accused of arrogance in his governance and of monopolizing public funds.

The rawādif themselves were not leaders of the movement, but they formed its popular base—the mass support that mobilized against Saʿīd ibn al-ʿĀṣ and against the caliphate.

We know that Caliph ʿUthmān ibn ʿAffān followed the policy of his predecessor in several aspects of financial administration. With regard to stipends (ʿaṭāʾ), he did not alter the system established by ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, except that he increased people’s stipends by one hundred dirhams at the beginning of his caliphate. It seems, however, that the financial resources of Kufa’s treasury were not sufficient to cover the stipends of all social groups. This forced ʿUthmān to transfer the stipends of many Kufans to the registers (dawāwīn) of other conquered provinces that were administratively under Kufa. Thus, al-Ashʿath ibn Qays settled a group of them in Azerbaijan, where they became affiliated with its register (dīwān).

The situation became even more complicated due to ʿUthmān’s decision to allocate (iqṭāʿ) the ṣawāfī lands—state estates—to a number of Companions and tribal elites of Kufa. Not only did he grant these lands, but he also allowed their lease and sale—in other words, he gave usufruct grants in exchange for payments to the state treasury. He justified this on the basis of public interest, arguing that it was better for the land to be cultivated and yield produce than to remain fallow. Yet this policy deepened the material and social gap between the classes of the early Islamic society.

ʿUthmān also took another economic decision: he permitted land and property exchanges between the people of Kufa and the people of the Hijaz. This allowed tribal elites who still owned old estates or houses in their original homelands to improve their finances by exchanging them for shares of land revenue (fayʾ) in the agricultural districts of Iraq. As a result, some notables of Kufa and the Hijaz came to possess vast estates in the villages of al-Sawād.

These exchanges created the first nucleus of Arab landowners in Kufa and gave rise to a dispute:

• one group argued that the ṣawāfī lands belonged to the soldiers, and the caliph merely administered them for the public good;

• the other maintained that the lands belonged to the caliph personally, and he had full right to dispose of them.

One serious consequence was that the soldiers (muqātila) realized that these exchanges were reducing the size of the ṣawāfī lands, and thus reducing the income they normally received from them. Their fears deepened when the governor Saʿīd ibn al-ʿĀṣ reportedly said of al-Sawād:

 “Al-Sawād is the orchard of Quraysh.”

These events, which took place in 33 AH / 653 CE, led to the rise of opposition in Kufa and the expulsion of the governor Saʿīd ibn al-ʿĀṣ. The rawādif who had migrated to Kufa had shifted the balance of power in favor of the tribal chiefs, because they brought with them large new groups who acted under the bond of tribal and social solidarity rather than state authority. The chiefs of these newly arrived clans felt a natural alliance with the older tribal leaders who had long been settled in Kufa.

At the same time, however, the rawādif became an economic and social burden upon those tribal chiefs. They were responsible before their tribes for providing new residential plots (khiṭaṭ) and sources of income to support them, for the state dealt with the tribes through their leaders, both politically and economically, a policy that had been in place since the time of ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb. The chiefs considered it their task to distribute stipends, organize military expeditions, assign residential plots, and manage all matters relating to public life, since they were closer than the government to the daily needs of their tribes in Kufa and Basra.

Thus, the influence of some clans and their leaders at times surpassed that of the larger parent tribes. The clan of al-Nakhaʿ, for example, became more prominent than its tribal confederation Madhḥij, due to its large numbers and the leadership of al-Ashʿtar al-Nakhaʿī, one of the key opposition leaders during the civil unrest, and a major political figure in Kufa.

A close look at the tribal composition of the Kufan opposition shows that it was concentrated in a limited number of tribes—those that had received rawādif—namely ʿAbd al-Qays, Tamīm, and al-Nakhaʿ. Nearly the same composition appeared in Basra, where the core came from ʿAbd al-Qays, Tamīm, and Qays. These groups traveled to Medina in organized formations resembling military units to present demands to the caliph, the most important of which were that he:

• Allow the exiles from Syria to return

• Not force them into long campaigns

• Guarantee them a share of state revenue (fayʾ)

All of these requests were meant to reduce the financial and social burden carried by the tribal leaders.

Iraq had become the most attractive destination for tribes seeking settlement and wealth—especially after the founding of Basra and Kufa and the stabilization of conquests under ʿUthmān. Iraq became the social and economic center of gravity within the Islamic state, which intensified the tribal opposition to the caliph and his governors, largely due to what was seen as Qurashī financial and administrative authoritarianism.

In contrast, Syria was almost closed to migration and rawādif because of the strict administrative system imposed by Governor Muʿāwiya ibn Abī Sufyān throughout his tenure. Yet even Syria received some rawādif for political reasons—for example, an entire quarter of the Kufa-based tribe Kindah migrated to Syria because they were loyal to ʿUthmān (ʿUthmāniyya).

Muʿāwiya settled them first in the Jazīra region and then in al-Ruha (Edessa), granting them land allotments, and they fought alongside him in the Battle of Ṣiffīn (37 AH / 657 CE) against the Iraqis.

It is clear that Muʿāwiya was careful not to settle the Kufan Kindah in the heart of Syria, but instead placed them in the Jazīra and along the frontiers—so that they would not mix with the Syrians or influence their loyalties.

The Problem of the Rawādif in the Umayyad Period

During the caliphate of Muʿāwiya ibn Abī Sufyān (41–60 AH / 661–680 CE), the issue of the rawādif re-emerged in Basra, once again leaving negative effects at the economic, social, and administrative levels. A new wave of raddifa arrived in the form of large numbers of clans from Azd ʿUmān, which upset the balance of power in Basra. The two dominant tribes competing for political, economic, and social influence in the city had been Bakr ibn Wāʾil and Tamīm. The sudden increase in the numbers of the Azd had a strong impact on political life, leading Bakr ibn Wāʾil to side against Tamīm and its ally Qays at the end of the Sufyānid era. In the Marwānid period, the Azd became a powerful tribal bloc that rivaled both Rabīʿa and Tamīm.

We also see that the Umayyad governor ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿĀmir (41–45 AH / 661–665 CE)—despite his earlier administrative experience in Basra during the caliphate of ʿUthmān—failed to resolve the rawādif crisis. His attempt to resume the conquests, which had halted during the civil war and caused the financial depletion of the state treasury, was unsuccessful due to the spread of disorder, theft, and moral decline in the city during his rule.

The notables of Basra who traveled to meet Muʿāwiya did not openly criticize ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿĀmir’s administration, fearing that if he were dismissed, Muʿāwiya might appoint over them a Syrian notable—or even a member of his own family—who might treat them harshly. Only Ibn al-Kawwāʾ broke his silence, informing Muʿāwiya of the deteriorating security and worsening conditions in Basra. As a result, Muʿāwiya removed Ibn ʿĀmir from office and appointed Ziyād ibn Abīh (45–50 AH / 665–670 CE) as governor.

Ziyād ibn Abīh then assumed authority over Basra and its dependent provinces, which included Khurasan, Sijistan, India, Bahrain, and Oman. His first task was to reorganize the administration of Basra. He reproached the city’s notables, holding them responsible for the moral and social disorder, theft, and widespread vice in the city. He promised them that he would not withhold their stipends or delay their payments, nor force them into prolonged military service on the frontiers—provided that they cooperated with him in restoring security and political and social stability in Basra.

Ziyād relied on the tribal elite to impose security. He requested from the leaders of Tamīm and Bakr ibn Wāʾil that they nominate trustworthy and respected men from among their nobles to take charge of the police force (shurṭa). They recommended ʿAbd Allāh ibn al-Ḥuṣayn of the Banū Thaʿlaba (Bakr ibn Wāʾil) and al-Jaʿd ibn Qays of Tamīm to serve as security chiefs, since both clans belonged to the largest and most influential tribes of Basra since its founding. Under Ziyād, the police force reached about 4,000 men.

The police successfully suppressed acts of vandalism, guarded the cemeteries whose graves had been looted, and enforced strict penalties: anyone who burned another man’s house would have his own house burned in return. Ziyād also imposed a curfew after the evening (ʿishāʾ) prayer to capture thieves, eliminate crime, and prevent political gatherings—especially by the Kharijite opposition. People would rush home after the night prayer, some even abandoning their sandals out of fear of being arrested. Anyone found in the streets after ʿishāʾ risked being killed.

Ziyād further banned the entry of wine imported by the Persian landowners (dahāqin), as it was a major cause of moral and social corruption. He also set the penalty for burning a date palm tree at 1,000 dirhams, and whoever could not pay was executed.

The problems Ziyād faced in Basra were not limited to restoring security and public order. One of the most serious challenges was the problem of the rawādif, which continued to produce damaging economic, social, and administrative consequences.

During the governorship of Ziyād ibn Abīh, new waves of rawādif arrived in Basra from the Bedouin regions. The sources do not clearly mention the reason for this renewed migration, but it was likely due to the political and security stability Basra enjoyed under Ziyād, as well as the desire of the newcomers to benefit from the city’s financial resources.

Ziyād was therefore obligated to provide stipends, rations, and new settlement plots for them. Al-Balādhurī reports that the number of soldiers in Basra during Ziyād’s time reached eighty thousand, whereas before they had been only four thousand. Likewise, the population rose to 120,000, after previously being around 80,000. This demographic increase threatened economic stability in Basra, since its financial resources were limited and depended largely on war booty and the land tax (kharāj) of the eastern provinces—revenues tied directly to continued jihad since the time of ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb.

Ziyād was compelled to take decisive measures to solve the rawādif crisis. He gave people a choice:

1. Either half of their stipends and rations would be deducted to support the newcomers;

2. Or each clan would take responsibility for financially supporting its own rawādif, while the state treasury would assist them by adding 100 dirhams to their annual stipend and 50 dirhams on the festivals of ʿĪd al-Fiṭr and ʿĪd al-Aḍḥā.

He also reviewed the payment registers, removing the names of those who had died.

In addition, he transferred 25,000 soldiers from Kufa with their families to Khurasan, both to reduce the financial burden on Basra and to strengthen Islamic and Arab presence in the province. Ziyād worked to restore loyalty in the eastern provinces, reestablish Muslim authority there, and settle Arab tribes permanently.

In 53 AH / 672 CE, he also relocated a group from the Azd of Basra to Egypt, removed their names from the stipend registers, and settled about 150 men in the district of al-Ẓāhir in Fusṭāṭ.

Ziyād reorganized Basra’s administrative system by dividing the city into five districts (akhmās), each headed by a chief appointed directly by the caliph. Their responsibilities included:

• managing administrative and financial affairs

• supervising the distribution of stipends

• recruiting tribesmen into the army and commanding them in war

• settling disputes among the tribes.

Stipends were now delivered to the chiefs of the five districts, who then distributed them through the clan supervisors (ʿurafāʾ). They were required to:

• verify registration lists 

• record births

• remove the deceased from the rolls

• monitor any political activity hostile to Umayyad rule and report it to the governor

• assume responsibility for paying blood-money (diyah).

By doing so, Ziyād stripped tribal chiefs of many of their former powers and brought them under direct state supervision, thereby strengthening the authority of the government and tightening its control over the city.

The sources make it clear that the administrative measures taken by Ziyād ibn Abīh to deal with the economic and social effects of the rawādif also included a reorganization of the economic system in Basra. Among these measures was the construction of the Dār al-Rizq (the Treasury of Provisions), which he placed under the supervision of ʿAbd Allāh ibn Nuwqil, a notable of Quraysh.

Ziyād fixed the payment of military stipends (ʿaṭāʾ) at the beginning of Muḥarram, and the distribution of rations (arzāq) to the people at the beginning of each month. In the month of Ramaḍān, stipends and rations were paid early. He also required those who owed the jizya but did not possess gold or silver to pay it in kind, in the form of goods.

He regulated commercial activity by designating specific seasons for buying and selling, banned market monopolies, and punished violations. Ziyād even cut off the hand of the slave of Fākhta bint Qurẓa—the wife of Caliph Muʿāwiya—after she asked her husband to grant her servant exclusive rights to the food trade in Basra. Muʿāwiya wrote to Ziyād supporting the request, but Ziyād refused to allow monopoly, enforced the law, and punished the offender.

Ziyād appointed al-Jaʿd ibn Qays al-Numayrī as market inspector, responsible for informing him about trade developments, people’s needs, and commodity prices. He ordered the roofing of the market shops and personally supervised price regulation, punishing those who sold above the set price.

When food prices rose, he subsidized the market from the state treasury, giving money to merchants on the condition that profits not exceed one-quarter of their earnings. Once prices fell, the treasury reclaimed its capital.

He also organized the distribution of charity funds from the Basra treasury. He appointed Abū Burda ibn Abī Mūsā al-Ashʿarī to manage the charity of the tribes of Asad and Ghaṭafān, giving him 13,000 dirhams to distribute among their poor. He instructed him not to give both silver and livestock to the same person, and to allocate part of the funds for the marriage of poor women to suitable husbands.

The sources do not mention a rawādif crisis in Kufa during this period. However, Ziyād took over its administration (50–55 AH / 670–674 CE) after the death of al-Mughīra ibn Shuʿba in 50 AH. There he faced difficulties in bringing the city under Umayyad control because of the strong opposition of the Shiʿa of the Prophet’s Household.

Al-Balādhurī records in “Futūh al-Buldān” that Ziyād relocated around 50,000 people from Basra and Kufa, along with their families, to Khurasan, settling them “beyond the river.”

 It appears that this was done not because of the rawādif issue, but rather for political reasons—to weaken the strength of the opposition in Kufa and to reduce the influence of certain Arab tribes.

Conclusion

Basra and Kufa suffered from the problem of the rawādif from the time of their foundation until the first half of the Umayyad period, that is, during the Sufyanid era. This phenomenon left economic, social, and political effects on Iraqi society, which can be summarized in the following points:

1. The influx of rawādif who crowded into the quarters of the early conquering tribes caused financial pressure on them, as they were obliged to support the families and clans of the newcomers by sharing their financial allocations (stipends and rations) according to the principle of social solidarity.

2. They were required to provide housing and new settlement plots, and many tribes were forced to accommodate the newcomers in their own homes and districts and share them with them.

3. These rawādif represented a social burden and an added responsibility upon the chiefs of the Arab tribes and clans, who had to petition the “state”—the governors and caliphs—to grant stipends and rations to the newcomers, and to raise them to the level of the long-settled population.

4. One positive effect was that these rawādif strengthened some tribes with new manpower and created significant tribal, social, and political weight in opposition to other tribes—especially in Basra, where the tribes benefited from them during periods of civil conflict, particularly when the Umayyad state weakened or during local revolts. These tribes also supplied fighters to participate effectively in the conquests toward the eastern lands.

5. The rawādif exploited their numerical strength to mobilize against the state, and they served as the fuel for several revolts.

6. The governors and caliphs dealt with the rawādif problem through several measures, including:

A. Increasing stipends and granting rations.

B. Opening new fronts of conquest toward the eastern regions and employing this fighting manpower to conquer new lands, thereby securing financial resources for themselves, their cities, and the state, in the form of war booty, fayʾ, jizya, and kharāj, in addition to military stipends.

C. Transferring the payroll registers (dīwān) of some rawādif from the record books of Basra and Kufa to those of the newly conquered cities in the Islamic East, in order to ease the financial burden on the treasuries of these two cities.

D. Restructuring and reorganizing the administrative system of Basra and Kufa, reviewing and auditing the names registered in the stipend records, and removing the deceased to ensure that only the rightful beneficiaries received payments.

E. Relocating entire clans from Basra and Kufa and resettling them in new garrison cities such as Khurasan, Egypt, and the Jazira region; these were known as al-Nawāqil (“the transferred groups”).

Sources 

1. Ibn al-Athīr – Al-Nihāyah fī Gharīb al-Ḥadīth wa’l-Āthār (“The Rare/Unfamiliar Expressions in Ḥadīth and Reports”)

2. Ibn al-Aʿtham – Kitāb al-Futūḥ (“Book of Conquests”)

3. Ibn al-Kalbī – Nasab Maʿadd wa’l-Yaman al-Kabīr (“The Genealogy of Maʿadd and of Greater Yemen”)

4. Ibn Ḥabīb – Kitāb al-Muḥabbar (“The Embellished/‘Inked’ Book”)

5. Ibn Ḥajar – Lisān al-Mīzān (“The Tongue of the Balance”)

6. Ibn Saʿd – Al-Ṭabaqāt al-Kubrā (“The Major Classes [Biographies]”)

7. Ibn Sallām – Al-Amwāl (“Wealth/Property”)

8. Ibn ʿImād al-Ḥanbalī – Shadharāt al-Dhahab fī Akhbār man Dhahab (“Splinters of Gold on Those Who Have Passed”)

9. Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr – Al-Istiʿāb fī Maʿrifat al-Aṣḥāb (“Comprehensive Knowledge of the Companions”)

10. Ibn ʿAbd Rabbih – Al-ʿIqd al-Farīd (“The Unique Necklace”)

11. Ibn ʿArabī – Muḥāḍarat al-Abrār wa-Musāmarat al-Akhyār (“Discourses of the Righteous and Conversations of the Virtuous”)

12. Ibn Manẓūr – Lisān al-ʿArab (“The Tongue of the Arabs” / “Lexicon of the Arabic Language”)

13. Abū Ḥanīfa al-Dīnawarī – Al-Akhbār al-Ṭiwāl (“The Lengthy Accounts”)

14. Abū Mūsā al-Madīnī – Al-Majmūʿ al-Mughīth fī Gharīb al-Qurʾān wa’l-Ḥadīth (“Helpful Compendium on Unfamiliar Terms in the Qurʾān and Ḥadīth”)

15. Abū Yūsuf – Kitāb al-Kharāj (“The Book of Land Tax/Revenue”)

16. Al-Iṣṭakhrī – Al-Masālik wa’l-Mamālik (“Routes and Realms/Kingdoms”)

17. Al-Balādhurī – Futūḥ al-Buldān (“The Conquests of the Lands”)

18. Al-Khaṭṭābī – Gharīb al-Ḥadīth (“Unfamiliar Expressions in Ḥadīth”)

19. Khalīfa ibn Khayyāṭ – Tārīkh Khalīfa ibn Khayyāṭ (“The History of Khalīfa ibn Khayyāṭ”)

20. Al-Dhahabī – Al-Khulafāʾ al-Rāshidūn (“The Rightly Guided Caliphs”)

21. Al-Zabīdī – Tāj al-ʿArūs min Jawāhir al-Qāmūs (“Crown of the Bride from the Jewels of the Qāmūs”)

22. Al-Ṭabarī – Tārīkh al-Umam wa’l-Mulūk (often known as Tārīkh al-Rusul wa’l-Mulūk): “The History of Nations (Prophets) and Kings”

23. Al-Farāhīdī – Kitāb al-ʿAyn (“The Book of al-ʿAyn”)

24. Al-Qazwīnī – Āthār al-Bilād wa-Akhbār al-ʿIbād (“Monuments of the Lands and Reports of God’s Servants”)

25. Al-Māwardī – Al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭānīyah wa’l-Wilāyāt al-Dīnīyah (“The Ordinances of Government and the Religious Offices”)

26. Al-Masʿūdī – Murūj al-Dhahab wa-Maʿādin al-Jawhar (“Meadows of Gold and Mines of Gems”)

27. Al-Marzubānī – Al-Mughrib fī Tartīb al-Muʿarrab (“The ‘Obscure’ on Arranging Arabized Words”)

28. Al-Wāqidī – Kitāb al-Ridda (“The Book of Apostasy [Wars]”)

29. Yāqūt al-Ḥamawī – Kitāb al-Mushtarak Waḍʿan wa’l-Muftariq Ṣifatan (“Homonymous Names Identical in Form, Different in Description”)

30. Yāqūt al-Ḥamawī – Muʿjam al-Buldān (“Gazetteer of Countries/Places”)